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VII. TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
A. Books and Magazines
1. Magazine Enjoined From Use of "'Playmen" Title
Separating the "Men" from the "Boys" was literally at issue in this
federal appellate court decision regarding trademark infringement be-
tween publishers of two male sex-oriented magazines. Based on likeli-
hood of confusion, the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling
granting the publishers of PLAYBOY magazine permanent injunctive
relief barring publishers of a similar magazine from using the word
PLAYMEN in its title or subtitle.'
Tattilo Editrice SPA ("Tattilo") began publishing a male sex-ori-
ented magazine in Italy in 1967.2 The magazine bore the English title
PLAYMEN, but was written entirely in Italian.3 In July, 1979, Tattilo
announced plans to publish an English language version of the maga-
zine in the United States.' To that end, it contracted with Chuckleber-
ry Publishing, Inc. ("Chuckleberry") for the magazine's exclusive,
world-wide publishing rights.' Before Chuckleberry could print its first
issue, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. ("PEI"), owner of the registered trade-
mark PLAYBOY since 1954, sued for injunctive relief.6 PEI alleged
trademark infringement,7 false designation of origin,8 unfair competi-
1. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 564 (2d
Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 564.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imita-
tion of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable limitation to labels, signs,
prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action
by the registrant. ...
8. Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of
origin, or any false description or representation, including words or 13ther symbols
tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
tion based on infringement of its common law trademark rights and
violations of the New York Anti-Dilution Statute.9
While the federal district court judge in New York was consider-
ing PEI's motion for a preliminary injunction, Chuckleberry offered to
change the name of its magazine to ADELINA with the subtitle,
"America's Edition of Italy's Playmen."' ° The defendants asked the
district court judge to sanction the use of the new name." The judge
advised the parties that this request presented a new issue for litigation
and therefore he would not address its propriety. 12 Nevertheless, the
defendants began publishing the magazine in January, 1980, under the
alternative title, ADELINA, using PLAYMEN in the subtitle. 13 In
February the district court judge granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the defendants' use of the title PLAYMEN. 4 The grounds
for the decision were three-fold: likelihood of product confusion, con-
fusion as to source, and subliminal or conscious association with plain-
tiffs well-known name.'5 The judge found that the confusion was
created by the similarity of the marks and the similarity of the
magazines in form and content.' 6 The judge was also impressed by the
fact that no credible explanation had been offered as to why the similar
name had been adopted "other than to trade on PLAYBOY's wide-
spread popularity."'7
Rather than appeal the order granting the injunction, the defend-
services to enter into commerce . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in
which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
9. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (Consol. 1980). "The section provides in substance that
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
or trade name shall be ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark or
unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition or confusion as to the source
of the goods." Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 939, 951 (1978).
10. 687 F.2d at 565.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F.Supp. 414
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982).
15. The difference between product confusion and confusion of source is explained in
the following manner: The consumer "may believe because of the similarity of mark and
product dress that he is obtaining the same goods he received the last time he purchased the
product in question. This would be confusion of goods. He might, likewise, know he is not
receiving the same goods but believe that the goods he is purchasing come from the same
manufacturer as other goods. This is confusion of source or origin." E. Kitch & H. Perl-
man, Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process 348 (2d ed. 1979).
16. 687 F.2d at 565.
17. Id.
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ants asked for an expedited trial.' 8 After the trial on the merits in Octo-
ber, 1980, PEI moved for a permanent injunction against the use of
PLAYMEN in either the title or subtitle of the magazine, published in
the United States and elsewhere.19 In addition, PEI asked for punitive
damages, legal fees and costs. 20 A permanent injunction and legal fees
of $5,000 were awarded because the defendants failed to controvert any
of the lower court's findings of confusion between the two magazines
upon which the preliminary injunction had been based.2'
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered whether the district
court's findings of fact regarding likelihood of confusion were clearly
erroneous within the meaning of the Lanham Act. 22 The court deter-
mined there was substantial evidence in the record to support the find-
ing of likelihood of confusion and affirmed the lower court's decision.23
The circuit court first addressed the use of PLAYMEN as the new
magazine's title.24 In analyzing the alleged infringement, the court
took the same approach as in McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc. 25
where the seller of "Drizzler" golf jackets sued the seller of "Drizzle"
women's coats. There the court employed a two-pronged test-
whether the marks are similar and whether the similarity is likely to
provoke confusion upon prospective purchasers.26
Applying this test here, the court looked to the uncontroverted tes-
timony of plaintiffs expert who characterized the purchase of a maga-
zine as a brief, four-step process, ending in impulse buying.27 The
consumer first sees the product on the newsstand where only the left-
hand comer of the covers are exposed. 28 The consumer then picks up
and scans the entire cover which is specifically designed to attract his
attention.29 The consumer opens the magazine to examine the contents
and finally, in sex-oriented magazines, the consumer flips to the
centerfold.30 In this context, the court ruled that the evidence sup-
ported the lower court's conclusion that PLAYMEN's presence on the
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 566.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979).
26. 687 F.2d at 566.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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newsstand would result in confusion.3'
The court then focused on the PLAYBOY mark's strength which,
according to the decision in McGregor-Doniger, will determine "both
the ease with which it may be established as a valid trademark and the
degree of protection it will be accorded."32 Here the court found the
PLAYBOY mark to be "distinctive" and widely recognized, "due in
large part, to the long standing success of PLAYBOY magazine."33
The court agreed with the district court that the PLAYBOY mark
was "suggestive," entitling it to protection without proof of secondary
meaning.34 A "suggestive" mark is one that "suggests rather than de-
scribes an ingredient or characteristic of the goods and requires the ob-
server or listener to use imagination and perception to determine the
nature of the goods." 35  Taking the ordinary dictionary meaning of
"playboy," the court found that it did not describe the product or its
contents and therefore was not "descriptive." If the mark had been
deemed descriptive, it would have been ineligible for trademark protec-
tion unless the mark had acquired secondary meaning-the special sig-
nificance that attaches to a mark when it becomes distinctive of one's
goods.36
The court also noted that the strength of the PLAYBOY mark was
reinforced by having been registered by the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office; further demonstrating that it was not "merely descrip-
tive," and giving it a strong presumption of validity pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1057(b).37
Next, the court compared the two marks in terms of their similar-
ity, pointing out first that both titles have the same prefix "PLAY."
Additionally, while the dictionary does not define "playmen," it would
appear to describe the same sort of person, though perhaps older than a
"playboy."38 The court concluded that the defendants had chosen a
word with a similar meaning to "playboy" to describe their similar
31. Id.
32. 599 F.2d at 1131.
33. 687 F.2d at 566.
34. Id.
35. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir.
1977).
36. 687 F.2d at 567.
37. Section 7 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1976) reads in pertinent part:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided by this
chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, registrant's
ownership of the mark, and of registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in com-
merce . . ..
38. 687 F.2d at 567.
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product.39 The product similarity is set forth by the court in a laundry
list of shared features, underscoring the strong likelihood of confusion
between the usage of the two marks.4" Both magazines had the same
cover layout, the same layout and design for the table of contents, and
the same content (including photographs of nude and partially nude
women, short stories, cartoons, celebrity interviews, and a three-page
centerfold featuring the "Playmate" or "Woman" of the month respec-
tively.)4 ' Also both magazines appealed to the same readership-het-
erosexual adult males.42
Not only was there strong evidence of product confusion, but more
significantly, according to the court, there was confusion as to source.4 3
Plaintiff's expert testified that the quality and name of a magazine are
important factors in creating any source confusion." Applying this,
the court found that "[tihe similarities of PLAYMEN to PLAYBOY in
its content and quality would likely result in consumers believing that
the former was sponsored by the latter. 405 This confusion was further
evidenced by the fact that several letters from purchasers of
PLAYMEN were sent to both PEI and PLAYMEN indicating that the
purchasers thought they had bought PLAYBOY magazine.46
Strengthening the charge of source confusion was the district
court's finding of "subliminal association. 407 The association here, it
was believed, would result in the greater likelihood of consumers notic-
ing PLAYMEN and a greater likelihood that magazine distributors
would handle PLAYMEN because PLAYMEN's promotion costs
would be reduced by its anticipated association with PLAYBOY.
48
The court was unpersuaded by the defendants' argument that be-
cause there are a number of other sex-oriented magazines incorporat-
ing the "PLAY" prefix in their titles (e.g. PLAYGIRL, PLAYGUY,
PLAYBIRD, PLAYERS), PEI cannot claim an exclusive right to all
such titles.49 The Second Circuit, however, found that there was a
greater likelihood of source confusion here because, unlike those other
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 568.
49. Id.
1984]
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magazines, these two are aimed at the same audience.5 °
The Second Circuit then analyzed the propriety of using
PLAYMEN in the magazine's subtitle.51 Again it applied the two-pro-
nged test from McGregor-Doniger.52 The similarity of the marks and
the strength of the PLAYBOY mark were established in the discussion
of its use in the title and were held to be equally applicable in the subti-
tle format.53
In addressing the second prong-whether likelihood of confusion
is created by publication because of the similarity of the marks-PEI
conceded that the subtitle would not result in product confusion, but
would create source confusion.54 The circuit court agreed. Experts
from both sides testified that subtitles are important in selling a maga-
zine, especially in contributing to impulse buying.56 The circuit court
found convincing the expert testimony establishing the subliminal asso-
ciation of PLAYMEN with PLAYBOY and cited a case where sublimi-
nal association was recognized as a basis for trademark infringement.57
Finally, the court gave considerable weight to the fact that the de-
fendants failed to offer any justifiable reason for the selection of the
PLAYMEN subtitle such as proof that the Italian magazine
PLAYMEN, upon whose reputation ADELINA had hoped to trade,
enjoyed some recognition in the American marketplace.58
Judge Mansfield concurred in part59 and dissented in part.6" He
concurred in upholding the injunction against use of the magazine title
PLAYMEN. 61 However, he disagreed with upholding the injunction
against its use in the subtitle, asserting that it would pose no substantial
likelihood of confusing "an appreciable number of consumers" 62 pur-
suant to the test set forth in McGregor-Doniger.
Judge Mansfield argued against the three grounds upon which the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 569.
52. McGregor-Doniger, Inc., 599 F.2d at 1130.
53. 687 F.2d at 570.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The case cited was Londontown Mfg. Co. v. Cable Raincoat Co., 371 F. Supp. 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. 687 F.2d at 571.
59. Id.
60. Id. (Mansfield, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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majority and the district court based their decisions.6 3 First, he coun-
tered the findings that the subtitle would create confusion by sublimi-
nal trademark association, stating that, "[e]ven assuming the validity
and viability of this amorphous concept of 'subliminal confusion,' its
importance when applied to the small subtitle is highly dubious since
Scott testified that subtitles play a minimal role in the consumer's
purchasing decision."' The judge further faulted the courts for as-
signing subliminal association the status of a separate type of confusion
which independently warranted a finding of infringement.65 Rather,
Judge Mansfield believed that according to the case relied upon for this
concept, subliminal association was merely a "psychological explana-
tion" for product or source confusion.66
Second, Judge Mansfield disagreed with the courts' giving great
weight to the defendant's motive in adopting the subtitle-to exploit
the PLAYBOY name, thereby causing and trading in on any possible
consumer confusion.67 On the contrary, Judge Mansfield was satisfied
with Tattilo's explanation that the PLAYMEN title for the Italian mag-
azine had been chosen in 1967, when PLAYBOY was still banned in
Italy, as a device to promote reader identification with a pre-existing
magazine, MEN, which the defendant also published.61 Judge Mans-
field argued that mere similarity could not constitute conclusive proof
of bad intent and he cited three recent Second Circuit cases wherein a
senior user's right to injunctive relief for infringement solely on the
basis of similar marks on similar products was insufficient to warrant
the relief sought.69 Had bad intent been proven, Mansfield continued,
it would have only given rise to a presumption of actual likelihood of
confusion which still had to be proved and in this case, was not.7 °
Finally, Judge Mansfield disapproved of the courts' reliance on the
factors justifying the injunction against the PLAYMEN title as support
for the injuction against its use anywhere on the magazine's cover.7 '
This he felt was unwarranted since the PLAYMEN subtitle was less
than one-eighth the size of the magazine's title and was qualified by its
63. Id. at 572.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cases cited were: Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden Inc., 644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1981), Affili-
ated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975), Beech-Nut
Inc. v. Warner-Lambert, Inc., 480 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1973).
70. 687 F.2d at 573.
71. 1d.
1984]
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connection to the specific Italian publication (i.e., "America's Edition
of Italy's Playmen").72 Further, he claimed, the distinctiveness of PEI's
mark and the degree of protection to which it is entitled, is reduced by
"the prevalence of competing or related magazines using titles with the
'PLAY' prefix."73 He admitted that while the potential for product
confusion may be minimized by their different readership appeal, he
contended that those magazines were "just as likely as the PLAYMEN
title to engender confusion as to source."74
Judge Mansfield concluded that the PLAYMEN subtitle created
no product confusion and little source confusion.75 He would have en-
joined the subtitle use "if and when the likelihood of confusion be-
comes appreciable," however, the status at the time of trial would have
led him to reverse the general injunction against PLAYMEN in the
subtitle or anywhere else on the cover.7 6
Following the case opinion are pictorial appendices displaying the
magazine covers of PLAYBOY and PLAYMEN.77 While such appen-
dices are fairly rare, their inclusion here is a definite boon. They afford
a visual comparison of the two magazine covers and graphically put
into perspective the subtitle issue. The appendices reinforce Judge
Mansfield's contention that the majority erred in not allowing use of
PLAYMEN anywhere on the cover. It is apparent that the innocuous
subtitle would contribute little, if at all, to the likelihood of confusion
as to producer or source, especially in the context of the consumers'
brief inspection prior to the impulse purchase. It is doubtful that any
purchaser would even see, let alone bother to read, the subtitle in this
instance. Moreover, the use of the subtitle is arguably a "fair" or "in-
formational" use of the foreign trademark owner's mark; that is while
PLAYMEN may conflict with PLAYBOY's mark, it is arguable that
the subtitle is simply designed to inform the public that it owns the
PLAYMEN mark in Italy. Seeing the insignificance of the subtitle in
relation to the entire cover makes one wonder what the brouhaha was
all about. With respect to the subtitle use, the dissent seems to have
presented the better argument.
Sherrill Kushner
72. Id.
73. Id. at 574.
74. Id. at 573.
75. Id. at 574.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 575-76.
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2. Jeans Counterfeiter Liable for Accounting and Attorney's
Fees
In a trademark infringement case posing some "hare-raising" is-
sues, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. ("PEI"), registered trademark owner of
the well-known rabbit head design and the PLAYBOY name trade-
marks, appealed a federal district court's judgment on the ground that
the court abused its discretion in failing to award treble damages, lost
profits, and attorney's fees.'
PEI had successfully brought suit against Baccarat Clothing Co.,
Inc. ("Baccarat") and Meier and Tchia Caspi ("the Caspis") who man-
ufactured and sold jeans using both the rabbit head and PLAYBOY
name on their jeans labels without first entering into a licensing agree-
ment with PEI.2 The district court had awarded PEI $12,750 in dam-
ages based on the revenue PEI would have received had the infringing
sales been licensed at PEI's standard royalty rate of five percent.
3
Neither attorney's fees nor profits earned by the defendants from the
sale of their counterfeit jeans was awarded.4 The trial court also re-
fused to increase the damage award pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117
which permits an assessment of up to three times the amount of actual
damages.5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part
and remanded in part, ordering the district court to award PEI
$120,000 based on an accounting of profits from the wrongful sale of
the 20,000 pairs of jeans bearing the fraudulent insignias, plus reason-
able attorney's fees.6 However, the Ninth Circuit again denied PEI's
request to treble the damages as permitted by 15 U.S.C. § 1117. 7
It all started when Baccarat and the Caspis, who operated whole-
sale and retail jeans businesses in and near Los Angeles, commissioned
1. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., Inc., 692 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982).
2. Id. at 1273.
3. Id. at 1274.
4. Id.
5. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117, reads in pertinent part:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office shall have been established in any civil action arising under
this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled. . . subject to the principles of equity, to
recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action . . . . In assessing damages the court may enter judg-
ment. . . for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding
three times such amount.
6. 692 F.2d at 1277.
7. Id.
1984]
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a local label manufacturer to produce approximately 43,000 labels
bearing the PLAYBOY name and rabbit head design marks.8 Approx-
imately half of the labels were then affixed to the jeans. 9 Although PEI
has granted the right to use the PLAYBOY mark to manufacturers and
retailers of numerous other products, in this case the defendants did not
even attempt to secure a prior licensing agreement.1°
On February 6, 1981, PEI filed suit in federal district court for
trademark infringement and false designation of origin under the Lan-
ham Act." Three days later, Baccarat and the Caspis consented to the
entry of a preliminary injunction and to the seizure of any counterfeit
PLAYBOY goods which PEI might find at any of the Baccarat store
locations.' 2 The next day, the defendants repeatedly invoked their fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination during a deposition
and refused to give any information regarding the manufacture and
sale of the PLAYBOY jeans or to produce any labels still in their pos-
session.' 3 In response to their failure to permit discovery, the district
court barred the defendants from testifying or introducing any evi-
dence with respect to matters about which they had failed to provide
such discovery. ' As a result, they were precluded from introducing
any evidence as to the number of infringing jeans sold. 5
Following a one-day trial on October 27, 1981, the district court
found that PEI's trademarks were strong, distinctive and had acquired
great fame, and that Baccarat and the Caspis willfully and deliberately
counterfeited these marks by their unauthorized use on labels attached
to the jeans they manufactured and sold. 6 These acts, the court held,
deceived the public into believing that the jeans originated with PEI. 1
7
In analyzing PEI's claim that the district court erred in failing to
award an accounting of profits, the Ninth Circuit relied on its prior
decision in Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. "8 There,
the court granted Fleischmann an accounting of the defendants' profits
after Maier Brewing and Ralph's Grocery were found to have willfully
and deliberately infringed Fleischmann's "Black and White" whiskey
8. Id. at 1273.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1274.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 390 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1968).
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trademark by using the same name on their beer. ' 9 The court held that
where trademark infringement is "deliberate and willful, and the prod-
ucts are noncompetitive, both the trademark owner and the buying
public are slighted if the court provides no greater remedy than an in-
junction. ' 20 The court then asserted that where there is direct competi-
tion between the parties, deliberate trademark infringement can be
made unprofitable by "an accounting of profits based on the rationale
of a returning of diverted profits."'" Furthermore, where the infringe-
ment involves no direct competition, an accounting of profits will ac-
complish the same end though based on a different rationale-unjust
enrichment.22
With reference to the instant case, the court expanded upon these
policy considerations underlying the Maier decision, stating:
[I]t logically follows that an award of little more than nominal
damages would encourage a counterfeiter to merely switch
from one infringing scheme to another as soon as the in-
fringed owner became aware of the fabrication. Such a
method of enforcement would fail to serve as a convincing
deterrent. . . .The judicial penalties imposed. . . would be
simply factored into the infringer's profit and loss statement.23
Additionally, by taking the economic incentive out of trademark in-
fringement, the court hoped to prevent injury to the consuming public,
who in the belief that they are receiving the same high quality goods
traditionally associated with the trademark owner, pay substantial pre-
miums for items bearing famous trademarks.
24
The court then reviewed the trial court's decision to determine
whether the trial court had properly recognized and implemented the
policy considerations underlying Maier.25 Noting that an accounting
of profits has been held to be within the court's discretion, the court
then looked to another Ninth Circuit decision to supply the standard of
review used to assess the propriety of the discretion.26 The court in
Chism v. National Heritage Life Insurance Co. ,27 had held that such
discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a "definite and firm con-
19. Id. at 124.
20. Id. at 123.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 692 F.2d at 1274-75.
24. Id. at 1275.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 637 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981).
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viction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment...
reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."28
PEI established at trial that the defendants made a profit of at least
six dollars per sale, amounting to $120,000 for the 20,000 pairs of jeans
sold.29 Applying the standard of review in Chism, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the lower court had made a clear error in judgment in
awarding PEI approximately one-tenth of the benefits which accrued to
Baccarat and the Caspis through their infringement.30 Underscoring
the fact that an error had been committed, the court posed the follow-
ing question: "Would a profit seeking business person, not unwilling to
violat[ing] federal law, pay ten cents to make one dollar? If the answer
is 'yes' then the trial court's decision did not follow this court's clear
mandate in Maier to make willful trademark infringement unprofitable
Any other remedy results in the defendants being unjustly en-
riched."' Thus, in opting for a payment based on royalties rather than
granting PEI an accounting of profits earned by the defendants, the
Ninth Circuit held that the court below abused its discretion. 32
Although holding that PEI deserved an accounting of profits, the
Ninth Circuit rejected PEI's contention that the defendants should be
liable for profit damages on all 43,000 counterfeit labels which the de-
fendants had bought and received.33 Instead, the court upheld the trial
court's determination that damages be allocated only on the 20,000 la-
bels actually used on the jeans sold.34 While recognizing that the de-
fendants had been guilty of willful trademark infringement, had been
abusive of the discovery process, and had been noncooperative, the
court rationalized that "an equity based accounting of profits premised
on potentially fictitious sales from which the defendants derived no
economic gain was not warranted."35
As for the lower court's refusal to increase PEI's damage award,
the circuit court stated it was unwilling to "engage in appellate factfind-
ing" and instead deferred to the lower court, confident that the trial
court's decision was supported by sufficient evidence.36 The court did
28. Id. at 1331.
29. 692 F.2d at 1275.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1276.
36. Id.
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not, however, delineate those factors which must be present before a
trebling would be permitted.
Finally, PEI claimed it was entitled to recover reasonable attor-
ney's fees, permitted in "exceptional cases" by the Lanham Act, as
amended in 1975. Examples of exceptional cases, according to the
Committee on the Judiciary, are "infringement cases where the acts of
infringement can be characterized as 'malicious,' 'fraudulent,' 'deliber-
ate,' or 'willful.' "38
The Ninth Circuit was persuaded by PEI's arguments that this
case was exceptional because the defendants' illegal conduct was "both
flagrant and willful. . . and compounded by the defendants' refusal to
provide any discovery whatsoever and by the defendants' repeated
Fifth Amendment pleas."'39 These arguments, coupled with the trial
court's finding that the defendants purposely arranged to obtain coun-
terfeit goods and to sell them as genuine PEI products, led the court to
find this case "exceptional" within the meaning of the Act.4° Since the
defendants were not innocent infringers, it was clear that the 1975
amendment was directed toward eliminating just this sort of activity.
Reasonable attorney's fees were awarded.4
The trademark infringement in which the Caspis and Baccarat en-
gaged in is part of a growing phenomenon known as "commercial
counterfeiting."42 According to the International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition, comprised of more than seventy major manufacturers seek-
ing to combat this problem, "commercial counterfeiting, operating on
an international scale, has reached epidemic proportions," resulting in
the loss of billions of dollars to reputable manufacturers throughout the
world.43 In the video industry alone, counterfeiters annually produce
records and tapes worth an estimated $6 billion."
The problem is not isolated just to the counterfeiting of principal
products, but extends to the various mass merchandise items associated
37. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), reads in pertinent part:
"The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing
party."
38. S. Rep. No. 1400, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
39. 692 F.2d at 1276.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1277.
42. "Commercial counterfeiting involves the intentional duplication (more or less) of the
trademark owner's mark." 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 145, 146 n.l (1982).
43. Rakoff and Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and The Proposed Trademark
CountrfeitingAct, 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 145, 147 (1982).
44. Id. at 151 n.47.
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with them.45 For example, the motion picture and television industries
are vulnerable to deliberate trademark infringement when their pro-
ductions spawn the lucrative merchandising of records, books, apparel,
toys and other tie-ins. More than one-quarter of the total revenue
earned by music entertainers derives from sales of various products
other than the music product itself.' Established stars such as Kenny
Rogers and the Rolling Stones have been known to garner in excess of
$30,000 on t-shirt sales alone during a single performance.47 Yet as
much as one-half the total revenue from such tie-in merchandise is esti-
mated to go to bootleggers who often sell unauthorized merchandise of
an inferior quality while cashing in on the famous name appearing on
it.48 Such occurrences will also apply to the principal products and tie-
ins associated with entertainers and performers in the fine arts as well
as sports personalities and teams.49
As commercial counterfeiting becomes more widespread, the rem-
edies imposed by the courts pursuant to the Lanham Act have come
increasingly under fire as inadequate.5 ° One recent law review article,
critical of these remedies, has identified this very case as illustrative of
the problem.5' Written before this appeal came down from the Ninth
Circuit, the authors characterized the case as one example of many
where the judge views the case as a routine dispute between commer-
cial parties and thus is rarely disposed to impose many of the strong
but wholly discretionary remedies available under the Lanham Act,
even though it would seem to warrant it.52 Beyond that, the article
continues, the district court's order for payment of a royalty on the bo-
gus jeans sold, in effect makes the counterfeiter "a licensee of the plain-
tiff." 3 The authors complain about the judgment's ultimate effect,
commenting that it does "more to deter victims of commercial counter-
feiting from seeking redress under the Lanham Act than to deter com-
mercial counterfeiters from plying their illicit trade. 54
By awarding an accounting of profits and attorney's fees, the
Ninth Circuit appears to recognize this growing problem and demon-
45. Bergen, Trademark Protection In The Entertainment Industry. WHA T'S IN A
NAME?, The Florida B.J., 461 (July/August 1983).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 163.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 164.
54. Id.
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strates its willingness to put some teeth into the Lanham Act in an ef-
fort to thwart future infringement practices. The court has broadened
the theory expounded upon in the 1968 Maier decision where an in-
junction was deemed an insufficient remedy for deliberate and willful
infringement. Here even nominal damages are found to be insufficient
as a deterrent and as a counter to unjust enrichment.
There are those, however, who would go even further, criticizing
the award of $120,000 as too meager. They are the proponents of a
criminal law, introduced in Congress as the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1982," which would provide penal sanctions for trademark
counterfeiting. Essentially, the Act would make it illegal to knowingly
traffic in counterfeit goods and provides for a maximum prison sen-
tence of five years per count and for fines of up to $250,000 per count
for individuals and $1,000,000 per count for corporations. 56 Currently,
punitive damages may not be recovered under the Lanham Act which
specifically states that any awards shall constitute compensation and
not a penalty." Nevertheless, in practice "most courts still consider an
increased damage award to be punitive in nature" and are normally
reluctant to make such awards, notes Joseph Fitzpatrick in his article
appearing in the American Patent Law Association Quarterly.5"
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision in Baccarat appears to
strengthen the current remedies available through the Lanham Act by
imposing an accounting of profits resulting in a tenfold increase over
PEI's initial award, perhaps that is still insufficient. The desirability of
associating one's product with the PLAYBOY mark which, as of 1982,
had generated sales exceeding $182 million, is obvious.59 The argu-
ments put forth by the proponents of new legislation that would pro-
vide both criminal and financial penalties for commercial
counterfeiting are persuasive. They warn that counterfeiting is not
confined only to "luxury" items, but extends to a wide range of health
and safety-related items such as drugs, fertilizers, chemicals, glasses,
computer components, automobile parts and aircraft parts. Infringe-
55. The Act was introduced in 1982 by Representative Peter J. Rodino (D-N.J.) in the
House of Representatives and by J. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.) in the Senate. As of
this writing, the Act is still pending in Congress.
56. 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 179.
57. Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976), reads in pertinent part:
"Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a
penalty."
58. Fitzpatrick, Damages in Trademark and Patent Infringement Litigation, 8 Am. Pat.
L.A.Q. 29 (1980).
59. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 420-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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ment in this context means real hazards to people and property and, to
some extent, jeopardizes our national defense and security. °
Within the constraints of the Lanham Act, the Ninth Circuit in
Baccarat awarded all that it could, with the exception of treble dam-
ages. The time seems ripe, however, for Congress to consider the pas-
sage of stronger legislation to ward off any further counterfeiting before
more lives and businesses are endangered. 6' The ramifications of this
unchecked white collar crime can no longer be ignored.
Sherrill Kushner
B. Television and Radio
1. "107" Not Valid Service Mark/or Radio Station
When do 107 and 4 add up to zero? When the users of these num-
bers try to claim trademark status for these number marks. In two re-
cent decisions, Walt- West Enterprises, Inc. v. Gannett Co. ' and Invisible,
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. ,2 courts denied plaintiff radio and tel-
evision stations the exclusive use of these numbers as trade or service
marks.' Each court held that the plaintiff would have to prove that the
terms meant something more than a location on a radio or television
dial to achieve trademark status.' In both cases, the plaintiff was un-
able to meet the burden of proving this secondary meaning.
Walt-West Enterprises, Inc. owns and operates a radio station in
the Chicago, Illinois metropolitan area. Plaintiff's station, WYEN,
broadcasts at a frequency of 106.7 megahertz on the FM radio band.'
Since 1971, when it was first licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), WYEN has used the number 107 alone, or in con-
junction with FM or its call letters, to promote and identify the station.
WYEN, which broadcasts primarily "soft-rock" or "contemporary top
40" as well as sports and news, has become known to some individuals
in the industry as FM 107.6
60. 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 152.
61. Under a new California anticounterfeiting law, a trademark owner can now legally
stop the sale of counterfeit products, have them confiscated, and recover up to treble profits
and damages. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14340 (West Supp. 1984).
1. 695 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. 212 U.S.P.Q. 576 (BNA) (C.D. Cal. 1980).
3. Both of these cases were brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (a) (1976).
4. Walt-West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1056; Invisible, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. at 577-78.
5. 695 F.2d at 1051.
6. Id.
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Defendant Gannett Company, Inc. owns and operates FM radio
station WGCI, which broadcasts in the Chicago area at a frequency of
107.5 megahertz. WGCI plays "black contemporary" music. 7 Prior to
1979, the station used its actual frequency for identification. However,
in 1979, it chose to round-off its number for use in the slogan "Studio
107. "8 After a brief period, WGCI discontinued its use of this slogan
after WYEN made a formal objection.9 In 1981, WGCI again began
using the number 107 in its on-the-air identification spots, but did not
use FM 107 in any other type of advertisement.
Both WYEN and WGCI are commercial radio stations which de-
rive their income from revenue generated from broadcasting commer-
cial messages.' 0 As such, both stations were keenly aware of the
demographics of its listening audience. Clearly, a station with a large
following is able to attract more advertisers, and charge more for its air
time than a station with comparatively fewer listeners. It follows,
therefore, that an accurate measurement of audience size is crucial to a
station's ability to attract advertisers.
The litigation between WYEN and WGCI stems in part from the
vagaries of this measurement process. Arbitron Company is in the
business of estimating the size and characteristics of radio audiences.I
Arbitron compiles a list of stations with large audiences and sells this
list to advertisers and radio stations. Not all stations in a given market
will make the list.
Arbitron compiles its list through a survey it conducts several
times a year in which it distributes "diaries" to a random sampling of
individuals in the market.' 2 Essentially, the diaries are time logs in
which survey respondents record the stations they listen to throughout
the day. Respondents are instructed to use the call letters of the station,
but if the call letters are not known, to use the name of the program or
the dial setting.' 3
In the case of similar entries, Arbitron will attempt to match the
entry with other specific entries appearing on the survey. For example,
if the listing "107" appeared in a survey which also listed WYEN, that
station would be credited with the first response also. 4 In the event
7. Id. at 1052.
8. Id. at 1051.
9. Id. at 1051-52.
10. Id. at 1052.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1053.
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that the ambiguity could not be resolved, Arbitron would credit the
stations with the ambiguous entries in proportion to the size of their
respective audiences during the previous year on a county-by-county
basis. This latter method resulted in WGCI being credited with the
majority of 107 entries in Cook County for 1981."5
When Arbitron released the results of the 1981 survey, WYEN did
not make the list of the top Chicago stations for the first time in nine
years. WYEN contacted Arbitron and discovered that WCGI was be-
ing credited with diary responses of 107.16 According to WYEN, at
approximately the same time the station also began to receive tele-
phone calls intended for WGCI.
17
WYEN filed a six-count verified complaint on November 4, 1981
against WGCI, alleging false designation of origin, service mark in-
fringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, dilution, and
service mark disparagement arising under both federal and state law.
The complaint requested compensatory and injunctive relief.'8
On November 5, 1981, the district court granted WYEN's motion
for a temporary restraining order, enjoining WGCI from using 107 for
identification purposes. 9 The court granted WYEN's motion for a
preliminary injunction on November 17, 198 1, and on December 7, en-
tered a permanent injunction against WGCI's use of 107 in connection
with its radio station.
20
The district court held that WYEN was entitled to injunctive relief
under the Lanham Act 2' based upon its determination that 107 was
WYEN's trademark (service mark)22 and that WGCI's use of the term
caused confusion in the minds of the listeners.23 On appeal, the Sev-
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1054.
21. The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
Congress enacted the Lanham Act to modernize, unify, and simplify trademark practice.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976).
22. Trademarks and service marks are governed by identical standards. Under the Lan-
ham Act, a service mark is a word, name or symbol used in the sale or advertising of services
to identify services of one person and to distinguish them from the services of others. Lan-
ham Act §§ 1 et seq., 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., 1127 (1976).
23. Wait-West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1054.
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.2 4
In order to understand why the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, it should be recalled that it is essential that a mark which
functions as a trademark be distinctive of the product to which it is
affixed or associated.25 Originally, only those marks which were inher-
ently distinctive and not descriptive of the characteristics of the product
qualified as pure, common law trademarks.26 Words classified as
"merely descriptive" were not considered to be sufficiently unique to
function as the producer's signature. Those marks considered to be
"inherently distinctive" were words which were "suggestive" or "arbi-
trary or fanciful."
27
Suggestive terms are those which suggest, rather than describe,
characteristics of qualities of a product. 28 A suggestive term "requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion to the na-
ture of goods."' 29 For example, STRONGHOLD as a name for a type
of nail with a special thread was held to be a valid suggestive
trademark.3 °
An arbitrary or fanciful word is either a newly invented word, or a
common word used in a fanciful way in relation to the product.3' An
illustration of this category is the trademark KODAK for photographic
products.
As trademark law developed, the courts took a more liberal ap-
proach to some of these "merely descriptive" terms. The courts recog-
nized that consumers may be misled by a competitor's use of
descriptive terms which had become associated with a particular prod-
uct over time.32 Judicial recognition of the need to protect consumers
and producers alike from this kind of confusion led to the development
of the equitable doctrine of "secondary meaning."
24. Id. at 1063.
25. 3 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 69
at 104 (3d ed. 1969).
26. Both Lanham Act and common law cases differentiate four categories of terms for
purposes of trademark analysis: (1) generic (2) descriptive (3) suggestive, and (4) arbitrary
or fanciful.
27. 695 F.2d at 1056.
28. Id.
29. Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F.Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. Independent Nail & Packing Co. v. Stronghold Screw Prod., Inc., 205 F.2d 921, 925
(7th Cir. 1953).
31. 1 H. Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks §§ 202, at 550, 203, at
554 (4th ed.).
32. 695 F.2d at 1057.
19841
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
The doctrine gave trademark status to descriptive words in certain
situations. For the doctrine to apply, it was not necessary that the pub-
lic be aware of the name of the manufacturer. What was necessary was
that the public think the product came from a single source.33 One
claiming trademark protection for a "merely descriptive" mark "must
show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. They must
show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the con-
suming public is not the product but the producer.
3 4
In Walt- West, the district court had rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the term 107 was generic and not susceptible to trademark
protection.35 Instead the court had agreed with WYEN that the term
was "merely descriptive" and therefore capable of becoming a trade-
mark upon a showing of secondary meaning. 36 The district court had
found that the number 107 had become sufficiently associated with
plaintiffs radio station through WYEN's extensive promotion of the
term in its advertisements over an eleven year period.37 The district
court also found that, while WGCI did not intend to pass off its format
as WYEN's, it did adopt the number 107 in an attempt to retrieve some
of its diary entries attributed to WYEN.3 s
The district court in finding for WYEN also ruled for that station
on the issue of likelihood of confusion.39 The court found that there
would be no confusion as to the identities of the two stations based on
the music played.' However, the court had found actual confusion of
listeners based on the results of the Arbitron survey. Moreover, the
court had noted the testimony of a WYEN official that the station had
received telephone calls meant for WCGI in its findings of likelihood
33. Nims, supra, § 37 at 154-55.
34. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). See, 49 Cincinnati L.
Rev. 698 for a discussion of these categories, as well as an analysis of numbers as
trademarks.
35. Wait- West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1054.
36. Id. at 1054-55.
37. In Hotel Corp. of America v. Inn America, Inc., 153 U.S.P.Q. 574 (1967), the court
held that a party may acquire rights in a designation which may be superior to any rights
that a subsequent user may acquire in a confusing similar term through use thereof in adver-
tising or promotional material connected with the publishing of goods or services, provided
that this use has been of such a nature and extent as to create an association of the goods or
services and the mark with the user thereof.
38. Walt- West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1055.
39. Crucial to a finding of a violation under section 43(a) is a determination that the
materials used by the defendants created a likelihood of confusion, deception or mistake on
the part of the consuming public. See New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d
1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. 695 F.2d at 1055.
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of confusion.4'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, while rejecting WGCI's conten-
tion that the term 107 was generic and could never become a trade-
mark, also rejected the district court's conclusion that the merely
descriptive term 107 had achieved secondary meaning by becoming
primarily associated with the single source, WYEN.42
In rejecting WGCI's claim that FM 107 was generic, 43 the Seventh
Circuit noted that the traditional definition of generic or common de-
scriptive names as enunciated in Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co.,44 i.e., a name "which is commonly used as a name or
description of a kind of goods" was of little use as a standard for gener-
icness where numeral marks were concerned. "Attempting to apply the
definitions enunciated in Miller to numerals is often a futile endeavor,
for numerals are meaningful only by virtue of the circumstances at-
tending their use."45
The court focused on the ordinary meaning of the term FM 107 in
determining where it fit on the trademark spectrum. Viewed as a ge-
neric term, 107 would denote the various programs which broadcast at
that area of the FM band.46 As a descriptive term, 107 would indicate
the practical location of the particular broadcast service.47 The appel-
late court agreed with the findings of the district court, which adopted
the latter approach.48 However, the court stated that even though it
believed the term 107 to be capable of becoming distinctive of a partic-
ular radio station, it was not inherently distinctive, and therefore, could
not become a trademark without proof of secondary meaning.49
It is in the crucial area of establishing secondary meaning that
WYEN's case was the weakest, and it was on this issue that the district
court's decision was reversed. WYEN proffered as evidence of secon-
41. Id. The court also rejected WGCI's "fair use" defense. The fair use doctrine will
permit a competitor the use of a trademark belonging to another in a limited fashion, if done
so in good faith. The court noted that since a whole number will normally be associated
with only one station in a given area, no good faith use could be made of the number
without causing confusion. The Lanham Act recognizes the defense of fair use at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115 (b) (4) (1976).
42. Wai- West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1059.
43. Id. at 1055.
44. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 501 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
45. Walt- West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1059.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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dary meaning the following: (1) that it spent approximately
$1,000,000.00 in promotion of 107 as a designation of origin, (2) that it
was the only station in the area that used the term for over ten years,
and (3) that it had affidavits from four members of the broadcast indus-
try stating that 107 was identified with WYEN exclusively.5°
The appellate court viewed this evidence as falling short of the
necessary degree of proof in several respects. First, the court felt that
plaintiff merely assumed what it in fact had to prove: that the term 107
was understood by the public as a designation of origin, not as a utilita-
rian method of indicating a FM dial location.
An important consideration in a case such as this is whether
WYEN emphasized the term FM 107 as a service mark or
trade name, or rather used it in its utilitarian sense . . . Of
course, WYEN's subjective intent regarding this issue is of lit-
tle moment, the initial question is how did it use the term.5
The court dismissed the evidence of money spent on advertising as
not dispostive, and concluded that use of the term in conjunction with a
term which is a clear and official designation of origin would lead lis-
teners to view the term 107 solely in its utilitarian sense.52
Short shrift was also given to the affidavits submitted by members
of the music industry. "[In testing the validity of common law trade-
marks the critical question is what the designation meant to the
purchasing public; not what the designation meant to those in the in-
dustry."53 In this case, the relevant public was the listeners of the radio
stations, some of whom had responded to the Arbitron survey. How-
ever, the method of recording the entries was so ambiguous that it did
not provide concrete evidence of secondary meaning.
In conclusion, while the number 107 was capable of becoming a
valid trademark, WYEN did not meet its burden of proving secondary
meaning.54 Unfortunately, while the Walt-West court was "left with
the definite and firm conviction"5 5 that the trial court. findings were
50. Walt- West Enterprises, Inc., 695 F.2d at 1060.
51. Id. at 1060.
52. The amount of money spent on promoting a trademark is never dispositive. "No
matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the
sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it
cannot deprive competing manufacturer of the product of the right to call an article by its
name." Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d cir. 1976). In the
case of a merely descriptive term, the money spent is significant only if it has led to an
acquisition of secondary meaning.
53. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1369 (10th
Cir. 1977), cert. dismirsed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
54. See Annot., 56 A.L.R. 232.
55. 695 F.2d at 1063.
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erroneous, the court does not explain what factors would have been
sufficient.
Amy Friedman
2. Television Slogan Not Valid Service Mark of Slogan-
Creator
In another section 43(a) decision involving a mark that included a
number, Invisible, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. ,56 a Cal-
ifornia court focused on the question of what group or "relevant pub-
lic" must associate the slogan with the producer, so as to demonstrate
the requisite secondary meaning for a mark.
In Invisible, Inc. the plaintiff, doing business as Klein & Co., was
engaged in the advertising business. In 1974, Klein developed a "total
identity promotional campaign" to promote those stations licensed to
broadcast on channel 4. At the center of the campaign were the slogans
"WE'RE 4" and "WE'RE 4 YOU." These slogans were highlighted
with music and animation, and were designed both to identify the sta-
tions and to convey the impression that the TV stations were commu-
nity oriented. Klein first developed the promotional package for WBZ-
TV in Boston, which aired the slogans starting in 1976. Thereafter, the
slogans were picked up by stations KOA in Denver and WDIV in
Detroit.
Defendant NBC owns WNBC-TV in New York. In 1977, an
agent of the television station viewed a videotape of Klein's campaign.
Instead of contracting with Klein, however, NBC worked with its own
advertising agency to develop a promotional slogan similar in format.
During May through August of 1979, WNBC aired the slogan "WE'RE
FOR YOU."
Afraid that the profitability and usefulness of its product would
disappear, Invisible, Inc. brought suit against NBC for service mark
infringement, unfair competition, and false designation of origin.5 7
The plaintiff contended that the use of "WE'RE 4 YOU" and WE'RE
4" in connection with the promotional campaign was known through-
out the industry to be exclusive to Klein & Co.'s clients WBZ, KOA
and WDIV.58 Moreover, Invisible, Inc. claimed that (1) the slogans
functioned as a service mark to identify its product (the campaign),
56. Invisible, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. at 57.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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(2) NBC's use of the almost identical "WE'RE FOR YOU" caused ac-
tual confusion in the promotional industry about the source of the cam-
paign, and (3) this confusion led to an injury to Klein's reputation and
loss of good will.59
NBC maintained that the slogans "WE'RE 4" and "WE'RE 4
YOU" could not be service marks because they were merely descriptive
of the channel four station.6" Additionally, NBC argued that the slo-
gans could not have acquired a secondary meaning which would entitle
them to protection because they did not identify Klein & Co. as the
source of the product.
The case was heard by the district court on cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. The district court found first, and most importantly,
that the "relevant public" for purposes of determining likelihood of
confusion and secondary meaning, was the television viewing public
and not, as Invisible, Inc. had argued, the promotional broadcasting
industry.6'
The relevant public must be considered to be the actual or the
potential consumers of the product so identified. This conclu-
sion follows as a matter of course when one considers the
objectives of the federal trademark and copyright laws. ...
[A] phrase which is merely descriptive. . . cannot be claimed
as an exclusive trademark [absent proof of secondary mean-
ing]. This result is easily circumvented, however, if the phrase
is developed by an advertising agency . . . and the advertis-
ing agency could claim exclusive rights to the phrase on the
grounds that it is recognized in the advertising industry as its
promotional creation. This would give a defacto monopoly
over the use of the phrase to the advertising agency's licen-
see-in effect, the same producer . . . who would have been
denied exclusive rights to the phrase in the first place.62
Once the "relevant public" was broadly defined as the television
viewing audience, the court concluded that "the primary significance of
the slogans remains the product (channel four stations) and not the
producer in the minds of the television viewing public.
63
Nor, as the court decided, did the slogans by themselves identify
the plaintiffs product (the campaign) to these viewers. "Rather, the
59. Id. at 577.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 578.
[Vol. 4
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
slogans are descriptive of, identify, and are associated in the minds of
the television public only with the particular television station."'
The most interesting issue presented by Walt- West and In visible,
Inc., is the question of when numbers can serve as service marks for
television and radio stations when these same numbers, either directly
or indirectly, describe the location of the stations.
When a whole number designation results from the fact that deci-
mal designations simply are not granted, such as in the case of A. M.
radio stations,65 then courts have held that the whole number designa-
tion may serve as a service mark without proof of secondary meaning.66
The whole number designation in that case is a distinctive indication of
source for the radio product as well as being a useful designation of the
exact location of the product on the radio dial.
The problem presented by the F.M. station designations results
from the existence of decimals and the industry practice of "rounding".
When a number of radio stations are distributed around a whole
number designation, the question becomes should one station be al-
lowed to round up or round down to a whole number, thereby appro-
priating the whole number to its exclusive use.
If a whole number is viewed as generic, that is, its primary mean-
ing makes it applicable to several products, or de jure functional 67 then
in no 6ase would a showing of secondary meaning be sufficient to es-
tablish service mark status for the number.
If however, as in Walt- West, the number is viewed as descriptive
of the practical location of the broadcasting service, or perhaps as even
"misdescriptive" of the actual decimal location of the station, then a
showing of secondary meaning may be entertained to demonstrate ac-
quired distinctiveness.
The court in Walt- West indicates the willingness of some courts to
extend the protection of trademark laws to numbers which designate
radio stations on a showing of secondary meaning. Given the strongly
descriptive aspects of whole number designation, however, Walt- West
64. Id.
65. A.M. radio stations present their own problems, however, since the practice in that
industry is for a station to drop the last digit of its assigned frequency. See, e.g., M.B.H.
Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 52, 54.
67. Covenant Radio Corp. v. Ten Eighty Corp., 203 U.S.P.Q. 452 (1977).
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also demonstrates the difficulties inherent in demonstrating secondary
meaning for these numbers.
Amy Friedman
C. Music
1. Pied Piver's Service Mark Abandoned
Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946, popularly known as the
Lanham Act, provides that a trademark shall be deemed to have been
abandoned "when any course of conduct of the registrant, including
acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to lose its sig-
nificance as an indication of origin."' This principle was applied in
Yocum v. Covington,2 where the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
("Board") held that Clark Yocum had abandoned the service mark
"Pied Pipers." This abandonment negated any superior right or prior-
ity of use which Yocum may have established in earlier years and
therefore, Yocum had no basis for cancelling Warren Covington's serv-
ice mark registration for the "Pied Pipers" vocal group.'
Clark Yocum was a member of the "Piped Pipers" vocal group
which became associated with the Tommy Dorsey Orchestra in 1939.
The group continued in Mr. Dorsey's employ until November, 1942,
participating in live performances and making a number of hit record-
ings frequently in conjunction with, and as backup to, Dorsey's star
vocalist Frank Sinatra.4
After the break with Dorsey, the group continued to perform as
the "Piped Pipers" and made several hit recordings (including "Mam-
selle" and "Atchison, Topeka & the Santa Fe") through a series of con-
tracts with Capitol Records, Inc. which ran from late 1943 to about
1950.' During this period, the group membership changed: Stafford
and Huddleston were replaced by June Hutton and Hal Hopper in
1944. The Hutton-Lowry-Hopper-Yocum combination allegedly en-
tered into an agreement that "each member would have an equal one-
quarter interest in the group, such interest to revert to the remaining
members on the demise of any member and with any replacement
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
2. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
3. Id at 215. The Lanham Act provides for cancellation of Principal Register registra-
tions by one who "believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064 (1976).
4. Id. at 212.
5. Id
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members to serve as employees, rather than joint owners, of the group
and its trade name."'6 The group eventually incorporated in 1947, al-
legedly for tax purposes and, at least in part, to protect the trade name.
The corporation was dissolved two or three years after its organization
for non-payment of franchise taxes.
After the demise of the corporation, the group continued to per-
form using the "Pied Pipers" service mark until 1967 when Yocum was
no longer physically capable of performing with the singing group. He
continued to claim ownership of the "Pied Pipers" name, to receive
royalities from previous recordings and to act as owner-manager or li-
censor of the group by seeking engagements for the group.7
Warren Covington, a trombonist with a number of major dance
bands, signed a contract after Tommy Dorsey's death to lead the Dor-
sey Orchestra in 1958. He was selected by Mr. Dorsey's widow Jane,
who signed the contract as president of State Amusement Corporation.8
In 1970, Covington was the orchestra leader for an ad hoc studio
group called the "Pied Pipers" which was organized to produce a rec-
ord album of some hits of the Tommy Dorsey big band era featuring
the "Pied Pipers." In 1973, Covington organized his own "Pied Pipers"
group which continues to perform with Covington. He applied for re-
gistration of the service mark "Pied Pipers," claiming first use in Janu-
ary of 1973. Registration issued in October of 1974.' Covington
continues to use the "Pied Pipers" service mark.
The Board attempted to delineate Yocum's rights to the "Pied Pip-
ers" service mark during the various stages of his association with the
group. It noted that prior to the break with Dorsey, Yocum was an
employee of Tommy Dorsey and that therefore title remained in Dor-
sey during that period."l There was no evidence offered to show the
existence of any agreement entered into by the Hutton-Lowry-Hopper-
Yocum combination dealing with the members' rights to the "Pied Pip-
ers" service mark. The actions of two former members suggested non-
recognition and unawareness of the agreement. In 1952, Lowry en-
tered into an exclusive agency contract for representation of a "Pied
Piper" group, and in 1970, Stafford organized an ad hoc "Pied Pipers"
group to make a recording with RCA Records."
6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id at 213.
10. Id. at 214.
11. Id Yocum entered this recording session with a claim of illegal use which resulted in
19841
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JO URNAL
The Board found that Yocum had established valid and prior use
to the "Pied Pipers" mark for vocal entertainment services, at least for
the period from 1950 to 1967. However, the Board ruled that there
were two instances of uncontrolled licensing' 2 by Yocum which pro-
duced a break in the chain of the continuous use necessary to prove
priority over Covington. Consequently, the mark lost trademark sig-
nificance during the period after Yocum stopped singing and until
Covington applied for registration of the mark.' 3 Therefore, Covington
could, legitimately adopt and use the "Pied Pipers" service mark. Yo-
cum's petition to cancel Covington's service mark registration for "Pied
Pipers" was denied.
The Board correctly applied the principles of section 45 of the
Lanham Act in finding that Yocum had abandoned the mark. A licen-
sor may license his mark if the licensing agreement provides for ade-
quate quality control by the licensor over the services produced under
the mark by licensee. "Abandonment because of uncontrolled licens-
ing is purely an involuntary forfeiture of trademark rights, for the mark
owner probably has no subjective intent to abandon the mark. Uncon-
trolled licensing causes a symbol to lose its meaning as a trademark." "
4
Yocum failed to retain supervision of the quality of the services to
be produced under the "Pied Pipers" service mark in his purported li-
censing agreements with Castle and Gotch. The Board was unable to
infer Yocum's retention of quality control from subsequent oral agree-
ments. 15 Uncontrolled licensing of a mark results in abandonment of
the mark by the licensor. 6
When a trademark has been abandoned, the subject mark is effec-
tively left open to adoption for use as a mark by others. In 1973, Cov-
ington legitimately adopted and used the "Piped Pipers" mark. After
Covington registered the mark,' 7 Yocum would not have been able to
payments by RCA Records of $300 and $400 to settle his claims of name ownership only.
Id at 215.
12. In July of 1967, Yocum entered into an agreement with Lee Gotch to pay Yocum
five percent of the gross income of Gotch's group in return for allowing him to use the "Pied
Pipers" name; in 'he late 1970's, Yocum entered into a similar agreement with Castle. Id at
215-16.
13. Id at 215.
14. 1 J.T. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 18.15 at 636 (1973).
15. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 215. See Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 198 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 610, 614 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Court unable to infer that quality control was retained in a
"silent" licensing agreement).
16. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367, 121 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 430, 437 (2d Cir. 1959).
17. Registration of a mark under the Lanham Act provides constructive notice of claim
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establish ownership rights in the mark by providing entertainment
service under the "Piped Pipers" mark. 8
Another significiant point raised by the Board is that the corpora-
tion formed by the Hutton-Lowry-Hopper-Yocum combination, and
not the individual members, would have been the owner of the "Pied
Pipers" service mark.' 9 Also, Yocum's belief that he had the exclusive
right to use the mark because of the incorporation reflects the errone-
ous belief that when a Secretary of State's office approves a corporate
name, this action is a substitute for obtaining a trademark
registration.2 °
The most frequent source of difficulty with group names has con-
cerned their ownership and the rights of former group members to use
the names. Most entertainers do not take the appropriate steps to se-
cure their ownership rights in service marks. Several entertainment
groups have successfully avoided the difficulties created by changes in
group membership. Yocum could have avoided these difficulties by
executing the necessary documents proving the existence of the agree-
ment between Hutton, Lowry, Hopper, and himself and by retaining
quality control in purported licensing agreements. "If a clear structure
of ownership and decision-making is adopted, trademark rights usually
can be effectively asserted to enjoin unauthorized use of the group
name by former members and unrelated infringers. '"22
Florence Hackett
of ownership by virtue of the registration and is prima facie evidence of the exclusive right
to use. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1976).
18. See Sutton Cosmetics, Inc. v. Lander Co., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(sale of goods under a mark can create no rights where third person at the time is valid
holder of the mark and is actively using it).
19. See Giammarese v. Delfino, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 162-63 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (trade
name normally resides in business entity and not in individual members).
20. See generally Borchard, Trademarks and the Arts, 7 Art & the Law 1 (1982).
21. The members of "The Drifters" assigned their individual rights to their manager.
Marshak v. Green, 505 F. Supp. 1054-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); the members of "Rare Earth"
assigned their individual rights to a corporation owned by them. Rare Earth Inc. v.
Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Other groups have
not avoided the difficulties: "The Four Aces" failed to expressly deal with ownership rights
in the name. As a result, the current group members were not able to enjoin performances
by former members under that name. Albertini v. Giglio, 459 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) A-15 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
22. Borchard, supra note 20, at 7. Cf Noone v. Banner Talent Ass., 398 F. Supp. 260
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). (A non-exclusive booking agent was held liable for damages for booking a
group under the name "Herman's Hermits" knowing that it did not include the lead singer
popularly known as Herman).
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2. Former Platter Enjoined From Using Service Mark
In Five Platters, Inc. v. Williams,' the New York Supreme Court
held that the continued unauthorized use of the service name "The
Platters" by defendant Tony Williams constituted a breach of contract
and consequently issued a permanent injunction restraining Williams
from offering his services or from performing as "The Platters" or from
using any name embodying "The Platters."2
"The Platters" was the name of one of the most popular singing
groups of the 1950's.1 The five original members formed The Five
Platters, Inc. in 1956.4 The corporation has employed a vocal group
under the name "The Platters" continuously since its incorporation.
On July 5, 1956, The Five Platters, Inc. entered into employment con-
tracts with each of the members of the singing group.5 Each employ-
ment contract contained the following provision: "Artist acknowledges
that the name 'THE PLATTERS' is the sole and exclusive property of
Corporation."
6
The Five Platters, Inc. registered "The Platters" as a federal serv-
ice mark7 and also registered "The Platters" mark in a number of for-
eign countries.8
Tony Williams was one of the five original shareholders and an
officer of The Five Platters, Inc.9 On September 28, 1967, Williams
entered into an agreement with Personality Productions, Inc. to sell his
shares in The Five Platters, Inc. The agreement contained the follow-
ing provision which expressly referred to the July 5, 1956 employment
contract between Williams and The Five Platters, Inc.:
Having Previously by employment contract dated July 5, 1956
acknowledged that the name "The Platters" is owned exclu-
sively by the corporation Five Platters, Inc., it is hereby ex-
pressly acknowledged again by WILLIAMS that the name
"The Platters" is now owned exclusively by a corporation
1. No. 72-8071, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1982).
2. Id at 28.
3. Five Platters, Inc. v. Purdie, 419 F. Supp. 372, 375 (D. Md. 1976); their hit recordings
included "Only You" and "The Great Pretender." Id at 376.
4. No. 72-8071, slip op. at 3.
5. Id at 5.
6. Id at 5.
7. Id at 11.
8. 419 F. Supp. at 375.
9. No. 72-8071, slip op. at 3; Williams apparently organized the singing group. 419 F.
Supp. at 376.
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known as "The Five Platters, Inc."' 0
The agreement further provided: "In this connection, WILLIAMS
agrees that he will not under any circumstances use the name 'The Plat-
ters', or any derivation thereof, in connection with any public appear-
ances which he may make as a performer of musical compositions."
Williams executed general releases in favor of The Five Platters, Inc.
pursuant to this agreement.
1 2
Since 1967, Williams had been billed approximately sixty times in
public performances under names that included "The Platters" or vari-
ations of "The Platters" without requesting or receiving authorization
from The Five Platters, Inc. '3 Williams had consistently promoted him-
self since 1967 as "The Platters" by use of photographs, publicity re-
leases, advertisements, and stationery, without authorization.
4
The Five Platters, Inc. has litigated its exclusive right to the service
mark "The Platters" several times with Tony Williams. In Williams v.
Five Platters, Inc. ,'" Williams appealled from a 1974 decision of the
Trademark Trial & Appeal Board denying his motion to vacate its ear-
lier decision which granted the corporation's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed with prejudice Williams' petition to cancel the
corporation's registration of the mark "The Platters." The court held
that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
vacate and affirmed the Board's decision.'
6
In the present case, the court found that Williams received valua-
ble consideration for transferring his right in "The Platters" name to
The Five Platters, Inc.'7 Therefore, the corporation acquired exclusive
ownership of the service mark "The Platters." Williams had agreed not
to use the service mark in any manner in connection with his public
appearances. He also executed a valid general release in favor of the
corporation. The court found that Williams willfully and deliberately
breached the agreement by using "The Platters" name without authori-
10. No. 72-8071, slip. op. at 5.
11. Id at 6. There was an exception to this provision that provided that Williams could
"refer to himself 'as having formerly been a member of THE PLATTERS' ". Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 8. The corporation has standing to sue as a third party beneficiary of this
agreement between Williams and Personality Productions, Inc.
13. Id at 9.
14. Id at 10.
15. 510 F.2d 963, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 744 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The court took judicial
notice of this case. Williams was therefore barred by res judicata from challenging the cor-
poration's registration of "The Platters" service mark.
16. Id at 965.
17. No. 72-8071, slip op. at 13.
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zation from The Five Platters, Inc." The court issued a permanent
injunction enjoining Williams from using the name because his contin-
ued unauthorized use of the name "The Platters" would cause irrepara-
ble injury to the corporation "for which there is no adequate remedy at
law."19
Since 1967, The Five Platters, Inc. has actively enforced its exclu-
sive rights in the service mark "The Platters" by sending numerous
cease and desist letters to club owners and booking agents protesting
unauthorized performances of groups under the name "The Platters."2
The corporation has also instituted numerous lawsuits to protect its ex-
clusive rights in the mark. In Five Flatters, Inc. v. Purdie,2' the corpo-
ration sued Purdie for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
Purdie was a member and road manager of a Canadian group which
billed itself as "The Fabulous Platters"; Purdie broke away from this
group and formed his own group, "The Fabulous Platters. ' 22 The
court held that Purdie had infringed upon The Five Platters, Inc.'s
service mark and had engaged in acts of unfair competition by attempt-
ing to cause confusion among the consuming public.23 Purdie was en-
joined from using the name "The Platters. 24
Williams' unauthorized use of the name "The Platters" and the
similarity of format between the corporation's group and Williams'
group created a likelihood of confusion in the minds of ordinary con-
sumers of entertainment. The Five Platters, Inc. asserted its exclusive
rights in the service mark against club owners and others who hired
Williams under names that included "The Platters." Williams was on
notice to the corporation's exclusive ownership of the service mark.
His deliberate acts reflected an intention to cause confusion and to ex-
ploit the good will associated with the corporation's name.
Florence Hackett
18. Id at 23.
19. Id at 25. The Lanham Act provides for nationwide enforcement of injunctions pro-
tecting federally registered trademarks. 15 U.S.C.§ 1116 (1976).
20. No. 72-8071, slip. op. at 24.
21. 419 F. Supp. 372 (D. Md. 1976).
22. Id at 377.
23. Id. at 382.
24. Id at 384.
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D. Character Merchandise
1. Drawings of Cartoon Characters Found Valid
Trademarks for Toy Dolls
In In re DC Comics, Inc. ,' DC Comics, Inc. sought to register
drawings of three of its comic book characters, SUPERMAN,
BATMAN, and "The Joker", as trademarks for toy dolls. The Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board's (the Board's) affirmance of the Trademark
Examiner's refusal to register the drawings. The CCPA held that the
drawings were not "so descriptive that they could not in any case serve
as trademarks"2 nor "functional" in a utilitarian way, as to preclude
them from functioning as trademarks.'
DC Comics, Inc. had filed applications with the trademark office
requesting registration on the Principal Register of drawings of the
three aforementioned comic book characters.' The drawings had
appeared on cartons containing toy dolls of SUPERMAN, BATMAN,
and "The Joker" and bore a striking resemblance to the dolls contained
in the cartons.'
The Board had concluded first, that the drawings in question
"naturally and normally direct attention to the appearance and purpose
of goods enclosed in the cartons' bearing the drawings, and are,
therefore, "so descriptive that they are not trademarks."6 Second, the
Board had found the drawings to be "artistic renditions of the dolls,"
sharing with the dolls the "commercially functional" features of
"customary dress, accoutrements and facial expression of the
character(s)." Accordingly, the Board had concluded that the drawings
were "functional in a utilitarian sense and for that reason are not
trademarks."7
The CCPA reversed by first explaining that a word or image is
descriptive of a product, and therefore unregistrable absent a showing
of secondary meaning, if "its use with that product conveys to one who
1. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
2. Id. at 1045. Section 2(e) (1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1) (1976) provides
that trademarks shall not be refused registration on the Principal Register unless it
"(c)onsists of a mark which.., is merely descriptive" of the goods.
3. 689 F.2d at 1045.
4. Id. at 1043.
5. Id.
6. Id The Board had considered the fundamental issue to be "whether an artistic
rendition of a fictitious character can serve as a trademark for what is a somewhat cruder
three-dimensional toy doll version of the same fictitious character." Id
7. Id.
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is unfamiliar with the product its functions or qualities."' Further,
"apt descriptive" words or images can never be used as trademarks
because such use would deprive society as as whole of the right to use
what are essentially generic terms or images that describe a whole class
of products.9
While "apt descriptive names cannot be trademarks for the items
they describe," the CCPA was "not persuaded to adopt the board's
interpretation or its derivative proposition that, by analogy, a picture of
a product necessarily cannot function as a trademark for that
product."1 The court concluded that the mere fact that a symbol tells
something about the product's physical appearance does not, in and of
itself, make the symbol unregisterable." Instead, Lanham Act Section
2(f) provides that a "descriptive" mark can be registered if it "has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 12
Whatever information a drawing of Superman or Batman or
Joker might convey to the average prospective purchaser re-
garding a doll resembling one of the related fictional charac-
ters is wholly dependent on appellant's efforts to associate
each character in the public's awareness with numerous at-
tributes, including a single source of sponsorship.'
3
Further, by registering the drawings as trademarks, DC Comics
would "not diminish the store of common words and visual representa-
tions" which others, including competitors should be free to use. 4
Consequently, the court reasoned that the drawings were not "descrip-
tive of toy dolls to such an extent that they are incapable of functioning
as trademarks for such dolls."' 5
The Board had also found the characteristics of the dolls depicted
in the drawings to be "indispensable elements of the commercial ap-
peal of the product."' 6 From this the Board reasoned that the drawings
were "functional in a utilitarian sense" and therefore could not be
8. Id at 1044.
9. Id
10. 689 F.2d at 1044.
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976).
13. 689 F.2d at 1044.
14. Id at 1045.
15. Id
16. Id The C.C.P.A. relied on circuit court decisions which had held that a characteris-
tic of the product was "functional" if it was "an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product." Ives Laboratories v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir.
1979) (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962).
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trademarks used to designate the product's source. 17
The CCPA felt the Board's interpretation of functionality was not
in line with its precedent. In the 1977 case, In re Penthouse Interna-
tional Ltd ,"s the court had held that a piece of jewelry, fashioned to
look like the applicant's logo (a stylized key design), "may have the
function of attracting purchasers, but the shape of the jewelery, like the
mark, is arbitrary and nonessential to a functioning piece of jewelry." 9
The CCPA in DC Comics found that the Board had obscured the
distinction between "utilitarian" and "aesthetic" functionality when it
labeled DC Comic's stylized drawings as "functional in a utilitarian
sense." 20 The fact that the dolls and the drawings shared "ornamental"
features was insignificant since these features did not give the dolls any
engineering advantages rendering them "utilitarian."'2 Therefore, con-
cluded the court, the drawings were not "functional" in a "utilitarian"
sense and consequently the drawings could be registered as trademarks
on the Principal Register.22
In a concurring opinion Judge Rich noted that the Board had not
only confused "aesthetic" with "utilitarian" functionality, but had also
applied the wrong standard in evaluating the issue of functionality.23
The Board had concluded that the drawings were not trademarks be-
cause they were "artistic renditions of the dolls," sharing with the dolls
the "commercially functional" features of "customary dress, accoutre-
ments and facial expression of the character(s). 24 Under Judge Rich's
view of "aesthetic functionality" a showing that a design is "an impor-
tant ingredient in the commerical success of the product" should not
automatically lead to a conclusion that the mark is unprotectable. 25 In-
stead, when faced with an aesthetically pleasing mark the question
should be whether the mark has also come to indicate a single source of
origin. In other words, "in the case of "aesthetic" functionality . . . it
would appear that a demonstration of secondary meaning is crucial.
'26
17. Id. See the concurring opinions of Judge Rich and Judge Nies in DC Comics for a
detailed discussion of functionality. See generally Zelnick, The Doctrine of Functionality,"
73 Trademark Rep. 128 (1983); and, Duft, "esthetic" Functionality, 73 Trademark Rep
151 (1983).
18. 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
19. Id. at 682.
20. 689 F.2d at 1045.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id at 1049.
24. Id at 1043.
25. Id. at 1049-50.
26. Id. at 1049.
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Judge Rich also adopted the position that the issue in DC Comics
was "whether a trademark may be registered for a three-dimensional
rendering of that trademark."27 Judge Rich felt that the DC Comics
case was analogous to In re Penthouse in that the court there had per-
mitted Penthouse to register charms shaped in the form of Penthouse
magazine's trademark-a key design.28 In Penthouse the court had
held that the jewelry could still function as a trademark even though
the jewelry items took the form of its trademark.29
Judge Nies, in a special concurrence, accepted the conclusion that
the drawings were registrable but cautioned against adopting the char-
acterization that "the doll configuration is actually a three-dimensional
representation of a trademark."3 Under Judge Nies' view, such a
characterization would circumvent the requirement that one must des-
ignate the goods for which the design is a trademark in order to avoid
treating a trademark as a right in gross.3
Judge Nies also responded to the Board's concern that by recog-
nizing trademark rights in a picture of a product, the product design
may be perpetually protected, contrary to the limited term of protection
afforded designs by copyright or design patent statutes.32 Judge Nies
noted that the existence of such limited rights is not a basis for refusing
trademark registration.33 Nor would trademark registration secure per-
petual trademark rights in the doll design since trademark rights are a
function of distinctiveness at a particular point in time. If it is estab-
lished that distinctiveness has been lost, trademark protection will also
terminate.34
Judge Nies properly emphasizes the basic tenet of trademark law
that trademark rights do not exist in gross. That is, trademark law does
not protect marks in themselves, but only trademarks as affixed to
goods.35
Faced with this axiom, courts have often been hard pressed to jus-
tify providing protection for trademarks which either cover an entire
27. Id. at 1047.
28. Id
29. 565 F.2d 679, 683 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
30. 689 F.2d at 1051 n.I.
31. Id.
32. 689 F.2d at 1052.
33. Id
34. Id. For a discussion of the possible clash of the public policies underlying trademark
and copyright law created by DC Comics see Anderson,,A Comment on the DC Comics Case,
73 Trademark Rep. 204 (1983).
35. See Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969).
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product,36 or comprise a part of a product.37 In DC Comics this hesi-
tancy was supported by the further argument that the trademarks were
functional and therefore incapable of serving a trademark function.
In re DC Comics however, reaffirms Penthouses' expansive view of
the protection to be provided marks which completely cover a product
and which appear to be embodied into the product. At the same time
DC Comics correctly adopts Penthouse's restrictive test of functionality
for such marks, and in the form of Judge Rich's concurrence highlights
the proper standard for analyzing the issue of aesthetic functionality-
namely the familiar standard of secondary meaning.38
Joshua Weinberg
2. MORK & MIND Y Valid Trademark for Decals
Every producer's dream is to create characters that not only catch
peoples' attention on the screen but also become household words that
can be used to sell a myriad of products. The planet "Ork" gave us
"Mork," and together with his earthbound companion "Mindy,"
"Mork & Mindy" have become just such names.
"Mork & Mindy" is not only the title of a popular television series,
but is also a trademark that sells chewing gum, notebooks, dolls and
doll accessories.' In In re Paramount Pictures Corp.,2 Paramount
sought registration on the Principal Register for the names "Mork &
Mindy" as trademarks for decals. The Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board ("Board") reversed the Trademark Examiner's refusal to register
the mark and rejected the Examiner's argument that the names were
aesthetic features of the goods rather than indications of their source or
origin.3
Paramount Pictures submitted as specimens of use, decals consist-
36. E.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Co., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (patches); In re Paramount Pictures
Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (decals).
37. In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (configuration
of spray bottle); In re Days-Ease Home Products Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (T.T.A.B.
1977) (shape of container for liquid drain openner).
38. 689 F.2d at 1049-50.
1. Reg. No. 1, 135, 853, issued May 20, 1980 (for chewing gum); Reg. No. I, 135, 855,
issued May 20, 1980 (for chewing gum); Reg. No. I, 137, 385, issued June 24, 1980 (for film
series); Reg. No. I, 137, 395, issued July I, 1980 (for notebooks); and Reg. No. 1, 139, 689,
issued September 16, 1980 (for dolls and doll accessories).
2. 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1111 (T.T.A.B. 1982).
3. Id. at 1112.
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ing of a photograph of the actors who portrayed "Mork" and "Mindy"
with the names "Mork & Mindy" superimposed over the bottom of the
photograph.4 The Trademark Examiner refused to register the names
"Mork & Mindy" as trademarks for decals on the ground that they
were "an integral feature of identified goods and, as such, fail to per-
form the trademark function of identifying or distinguishing appli-
cant's goods from the goods of others."5 The Examiner felt that
consumers would regard the words "Mork & Mindy" as aesthetic fea-
tures of the goods rather than as an indication of their source or origin.6
The Board found the case at bar to be analagous to In re Olin
Corp. ,7 and relying on that case, found the decals to be registrable. In
Olin the Board had held that the ornamentation of a T-shirt can be
such that it inherently functions as an indication of the secondary
source of a T-shirt (rather than the source of manufacture).8 As an
arbitrary symbol which was already functioning as a trademark for
other goods, the Board concluded that a mark comprised of a stylized
letter "0" (Olin's corporate logo), served as an identifier of the secon-
dary source for T-shirts, and as such was registrable.9 In Olin, the test
applied was whether the subject matter to be registered was "without
any meaning other than as mere ornamentation" and therefore was in-
capable of functioning as an indication of source.' 0
The core of the Examiner's objection in Paramount then, was that
the subject matter of registration (the names on the decals) were so
ornamental that consumers would not see them As an indication of
source." The Board rejected this argument and instead stated that:
"where such a sign also serves a source indicating function, it should
also be regarded as acceptable subject matter for registration".' 2 Ap-
plying the Olin test, the Board concluded that "the paired names 'Mork
& Mindy,' while certainly part of the ornamentation of the decal, also
indicate source or origin in the proprietor of the Mark & Mindy televi-
sion series in the same sense as the stylized "0" in Olin."'3
Additionally, the Board thought it significant that the licensing of
4. Id. at 1111.
5. Id
6. Id at 1112.
7. 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
8. 213 U.S.P.Q. at 1112.
9. Id.
10. Id at 1113.
11. Id at 1112.
12. Id at 1113 (emphasis added).
13. Id
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character names and images as trademarks for collateral products had
become a "common merchandising technique."' 4 The Board consid-
ered this significant because it showed that consumers are "accustomed
to seeing characters' names and images used as trademarks to indicate
source of origin."' 5 This was further evidence that a mark can be both
ornamental and indicate the source of goods.
The Board also rejected the suggestion that International Order of
Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co. 16 was controlling authority.
In that case, plaintiff had permitted many jewelers, including
the defendant, to produce unauthorized "unofficial" jewelry
bearing the plaintiff's emblem. It was as a result of this activ-
ity rather than the nature of the use that the trademark func-
tion of the plaintiff's emblem had been diluted to the point
that it no longer indicated a single "official" source of jewelry
bearing the emblem.'7
In closing, the Board dealt with the Examining Attorney's implica-
tion that registration would have been granted if the mark had been
used on a label affixed to the product instead of as a component of the
product itself:
In every case, the question is not whether the mark has been
associated with the goods by a particular mode or manner,
but whether the matter sought to be registered performs the
function of a trademark by signifying to purchasers the source
of the goods sold or offered for sale. Even if a mark covers
the entire surface of a product, that fact does not necessarily
mean that the mark does not perform a trademark function.' 8
As was seen in the accompanying review of In re DC Comics, Inc.,
trademark law appears to be coming to uneasy terms with the fact that
a mark may cover a significant part of a product and still be protectable
as a trademark.
Faced with a claim of "aesthetic functionality," the Board in Para-
mount correctly emphasized, as did Judge Rich in his DC Comics con-
currence, that the real question in cases of putatively ornamental marks
14. Id. at 1114.
15. Id.
16. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. 213 U.S.P.Q. at 1114.
18. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted).
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is whether the mark also has source-indicating characteristics.' 9
Joshua Weinberg
E. Toys and Games
1. Rubik's Cube Puzzle Protected From Counterfeiters
The "Rubik's Cube" is notorious for causing frustration in many
Americans. Before giving up on the puzzle in despair and blaming the
Rubik's Cube for your anxiety, look closely at the label. It may be that,
in fact, the cause of your frustration is not the Rubik's Cube but a
clever imitation.
In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Manufacturing Corp., I a prelimi-
nary injunction was affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
prohibiting Plawner Toy Manufacturing Corporation from copying
and distributing puzzles with trade dress simulating Ideal's unpatented
Rubik's Cube puzzle.
Ideal distributed the Rubik's Cube in the U.S. pursuant to an ar-
rangement with the Hungarian inventor of the cube, Erno Rubik. Ideal
packages its puzzle in a clear plastic cylinder that is sealed to a black
plastic base by a strip of black and gold tape displaying the legend
"Rubik's Cube." The cube itself is composed of 26 smaller cubes
presenting a total of 54 faces colored with six primary colors-red,
blue, green, yellow, orange, and white-on a black gridwork. When
sold, the cube is aligned to present six monochromatic faces-the "start
position." Plawner imports and distributes an identical cube which it
sells in packaging identical to Ideal's, except for lettering on the tape
strip which reads "Wonderful Puzzler" instead of "Rubik's Cube."
Unlike Ideal, Plawner sells its cube puzzle in a variety of sizes and
configurations.2
Ideal sought to enjoin the distribution of the "Wonderful Puzzler"
alleging that Plawner had, without consent, imitated the packaging and
trade dress of the Rubik's Cube so as to confuse the public and palm off
Plawner's product as Ideal's. Ideal claimed unfair competition and
common law trademark infringement under New Jersey law in addi-
tion to a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
19. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1049-50 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J, concurring).
See accompanying survey article at 273.
1. 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982). See Ideal Corporation v. Chinese Arts & Crafts, Inc.,
530 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Rubik's Cube imitator enjoined from copying and dis-
tributing its identical puzzle on basically the same grounds as in the Plawner case).
2. Id. at 79.
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§ 1125(a).3
The district court found that Ideal was likely to prevail on the
merits of its claims and granted the preliminary injunction against
Plawner. The appellate court, after reviewing the district court's ruling
to determine if there was any abuse of discretion, obvious error in ap-
plying the law, or a serious mistake concerning the proof, affirmed the
district court's ruling.4 In response to appellee's contention that the or-
der of preliminary injunction entered by the district court failed to pro-
vide it fair notice of the conduct that the court intended to prohibit, the
court modified the wording of the injunction itself.5
Plawner's primary defense was based on the twin cases, Sears,
Roebuck & Company v. Stiffel Co. 6 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.7 in which the Supreme Court held that state laws of un-
fair competition may not be used to impose liability for copying an
unpatented product and thereby effectively produce a perpetual patent.
In dismissing Plawner's Sears-Compco argument, the court relied on
SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc. 8 which con-
cluded that the Supreme Court in Sears-Compco did not disturb the
states' power to prevent the consumer from being misled as to the
source of the product.9 Therefore, the court concluded that Sears-
Compco does not preclude a court from affording protection from in-
fringement of a design element that has achieved secondary meaning
and is.non-functional, notwithstanding the absence of a patent."'"
The question that remained was whether the Rubik's Cube's ap-
pearance and packaging was non-functional and had acquired secon-
dary meaning.
3. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of
such designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the
same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be
transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in
the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or representation.
4. 685 F.2d at 85.
5. Id. at 83-85.
6. 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (cited in 685 F.2d at 81).
7. 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (cited in 685 F.2d at 81).
8. 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (cited in 685 F.2d at 80).
9. Ideal, 685 F.2d at 81.
10. Id.
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
"A feature of goods is considered non-functional if 'the element of
the product serves no purpose other than identification.' "" On the
other hand, a feature is "functional" if it is "essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."' 2
The court found that "given the wide variety of possible marks, the
actual colors and patches on the face of the cube served no purpose
other than identification and were therefore, non-functional."' 3 Fur-
thermore, the clear cylindric package with a black base was described
as "almost incidental" and therefore, also non-functional.'
4
The court then turned to the issue of secondary meaning. "When
the primary significance of the trade dress to a consumer is in designat-
ing not the product but its producer, the trade dress has acquired secon-
dary meaning."' 5  When a product's trade dress has acquired
secondary meaning, any copying will cause confusion in the minds of
the consumers as to the copy's source.
In considering whether the trade dress of the Rubik's Cube had
acquired secondary meaning, the court looked to the length of use,
buyer association, extent of sales and advertising, and the fact of copy-
ing.'6 In fact, counsel for Plawner had admitted its puzzle was an imi-
tation of the Rubik's Cube. In response, the court commented that,
"this admission of copying is itself persuasive evidence of secondary
meaning."'" In addition, the court considered that Ideal had expended
almost two million dollars in advertising and had used the trade dress
and package design for approximately one year. Further evidence of
secondary meaning was supplied by the fact that the Rubik's Cube had
been highly successful, selling over five million units in the previous
year. Also, Ideal introduced a survey in which 40 per cent of the re-
spondents identified a Rubik's Cube imitation identical to Plawner's as
a Rubik's Cube. Moreover, there was some evidence that Plawner's
cube had been mistakenly returned to Ideal for repair.
Given this evidence, the court determined that the trial court had
not erred in finding that the trade dress of Rubik's Cube had acquired
secondary meaning. Therefore, the court held that the district court
had not erred or abused its discretion when it found that Ideal was
likely to succeed on the merits and had granted the preliminary injunc-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 82.
16. Id.
17. Id.
[Vol. 4
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
tion. The court found however that the district court's preliminary in-
junction failed to provide Plawner with fair notice of the conduct that
the court intended to prohibit. Specifically, the district court failed to
describe the Rubik's Cube in detail so as to identify the product's trade
dress, the copying of which was to be enjoined.'
The Plawner case: reminds us that state unfair competition law
protection for trade dress survives Sears- Compco 19 expands the cover-
age of the term "trade dress" to include a product feature which has not
traditionally been associated with that term;20 and reflects the increased
application of section 43(a) to trade dress cases.
When the Sears and Compco decisions were handed down in
1964, it had been thought that these decisions signaled the end of state
unfair competition protection against the copying of unpatented prod-
ucts. 22 Despite these early fears, courts have steadily distinguished
Sears-Compco in order to provide unfair competition protection for
unpatented product and packaging features.23
The Supreme Court in Sears had held that selling a lamp identical
to that sold by the appellant was permissible because an unpatented
article is "in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever
chooses to do so. '' 24 The court summed up its position by stating that
"[b]ecause of federal patent laws, a State may not, when the article is
unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself
or award damages for such copying. ' 25 The Compco decision reiter-
ated the Sears position that to "forbid copying would interfere with the
federal policy. . . of allowing free access to copy whatever federal pat-
ent and copyright laws leave in the public domain. '"26
One way courts have been able to avoid a head-on collision with
Sears-Compco in the trade-dress area is to point to language in Sears
which distinguishes product configurations on one hand, from marks,
labels, dress and packaging on the other:
27
18. Id. at 83.
19. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
21. See generaly Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 77 (1982).
22. See Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
tion, 67 Trademark Rep. 132 (1977).
23. 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 7.25 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
24. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
25. Id. at 232-33.
26. Compco, 376 U.S. at 237.
27. Dannay, supra note 20.
19841
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JO URNAL
Doutbless a State may in appropriate circumstances, require
that goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or
that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers
from being misled as to the source, just as it may protect busi-
nesses in the use of their trademarks, labels or distinctive
dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by
imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as to the
source of the goods.28
By characterizing the cube face patches as trade dress, Plawner
avails itself of this distinction between product configuration and pack-
age or trade dress configuration. At the same time, Plawner departs
from the traditional notion of trade dress as "packaging."29 Plawner
recognizes that frequently a product's appearance, created by what
seems more like a product feature than a packaging feature, may still
"function as its packaging, incorporating elements intended to distin-
guish it from competing products. ' 3° This characterization is another
example of the increasing tendency of courts to regard the distinction
between product and trade dress imitation as a distinction without a
difference.
3'
Finally, regardless of whether product or package appearance imi-
tation is in question, Plawner demonstrates section 43(a)'s continuing
utility as a basis for protecting unpatented, nonfunctional design
elements.
32
Elise Rickenbach
2. SIMON Trademark Found Valid
What do the children's game "Simon Says" and the electronic
game SIMON have in common? Not enough to preclude the Milton
Bradley Company from registering the mark SIMON for its electronic
command-response parlor game according to the Patent and Trade-
mark Office's Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the Board).
In Entex Industries, Inc. v. Milton Bradley Co. ,I Entex Industries,
Inc. opposed Milton Bradley's registration of the mark SIMON on the
grounds that the applicant's game SIMON is an electronic simulation
28. Sears, 376 U.S. at 232.
29. Ideal, 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.2. See Note, supra note 19, at 79.
30. Note, supra note 19 at 79.
31. Id.
32. See generally, Note, supra note 19.
1. 213 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 1116 (TTAB 1982).
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of the children's game "Simon Says" and that the registration would
interfere with Entex's right to use the common, descriptive and generic
term "Simon Says" in connection with their electronic command-re-
sponse games.2 Entex Industries took the position that: SIMON is a
shorthand reference for "Simon Says" because "Simon" is the name of
the leader in the game "Simon Says"; that Milton Bradley's game is an
electronic simulation of the game "Simon Says"; that the term "SI-
MON" is therefore generic as applied to the game; and that "SIMON"
is generic because it is the "genus" for the game.3
Milton Bradley's SIMON is an electronic command-response
game which uses computer chips to control sequences of flashing lights
and sounds. The base unit bears on its face four lenses, each of which
is a different color. The object of the game is to repeat the random
signals the machine gives to the players. The game can be played by
one or more players.
When the start button is pressed, one of the colored lenses
lights up accompanied by a sound associated with that lens.
The player duplicates that signal by pressing that lens. The
base unit duplicates that signal and adds one more. The
player in turn repeats the signals by pressing the same color
lenses. The base unit duplicates the first two signals and adds
another one. The process continues until the player 'wins' by
completing a certain number of sequences correctly or 'loses'
either by failing to repeat a sequence exactly or by taking
more than five seconds to repeat a signal. . . There are four
skill levels involving increasingly longer and faster sequences
of signals.4
The box in which the game is sold, in addition to the mark SI-
MON, says "THINK FAST! Simon says repeat my flashing LIGHTS
and SOUNDS."5 The instruction booklet contains the statement "SI-
MON says, chase my flashing lights and sounds!"6
In considering Milton Bradley's trademark application, the board
also noted that the SIMON game had been very successful on the mar-
ket.' In fact, a number of imitations had appeared on the market with
names such as "Sharpen Your Memory," "Monkey See Monkey Do,"
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1119.
4. Id. at 1118.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1119.
7. Id. at 1118.
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
"Copy Cat," "Mimic," "Match Me," "Follow Me," and "Fabulous
Fred."'
The Board also heard testimony by Milton Bradley executives stat-
ing that the reason the game was named SIMON was to "add warmth"
to the product and give it "personality." 9
The children's game "Simon Says" was found to have many ver-
sions.'0 The most common version was described as follows:
One player, the leader is Simon. He faces the other players,
and commands them to do certain actions, such as: "Clap
hands!" "Turn around!" "Touch your toes!" As Simon gives
each command, he does each action himself, and the other
players must immediately imitate the action-but only if the
command was preceded by the words, "Simon Says!" If Si-
mon does not say "Simon Says," the players should ignore the
command and do nothing. Any player who makes a mistake,
by not moving when he should or vice versa, is elimi-
nated. . . . The last player to survive is the winner."
The board considered all of this evidence to decide whether the
name SIMON as applied to Milton Bradley's game was "generic" or
"merely descriptive" of the game "Simon Says."' 2
The board stated that:
A mark is merely descriptive if, as applied to an applicant's
goods, it describes a feature or the ingredients, qualities, or
characteristics of the goods, or if it directly conveys informa-
tion regarding a property, function, purpose, or use of the
goods. Further, if a mark functions as an indication of origin,
it is not merely descriptive.'
3
In considering the words "Simon Says" on the game's box and in
its instruction booklet, the Board noted that the product is "likely to
call to mind the children's game "Simon Says.""' Nevertheless, the
board found that the term SIMON is not the same as the term "Simon
Says" and purchasers were not likely to identify the term SIMON as a
shorthand reference to the game "Simon Says.""'
8. Id. at 1119.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1118.
11. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting Kraus, Recreation Today 340-41 (2d ed. 1977).
12. 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1120.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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At the same time, the term "SIMON" is not the same as the
term "Simon Says," and opposer has not persuaded us that
purchasers would be likely to perceive the term "SIMON," as
used on applicant's game, as a shorthand reference to "Simon
Says" and hence as a generic name for the game. 16
Instead of being a shorthand reference to "Simon Says," the board
found the name to have a strong connotation as a name of a "human-
ized or personalized computer."'
' 7
Further evidence that SIMON is not the same as "Simon Says" is
demonstrated by the fact that "Simon Says" requires many participants
while SIMON can be played by one to four players. Further, in "Si-
mon Says," players only respond to commands prefaced by the words
"Simon Says" while in SIMON, every command requires a response.
Finally, "Simon Says" often involves some kind of trickery on the part
of Simon while SIMON relies only on the player's memory to win.'"
After considering this evidence, the board concluded that "the
term 'SIMON' is no more than suggestive as applied to applicant's elec-
tronic game. The Board granted Milton Bradley's application finding
no reason to believe that Entex or other competitors would be inhibited
from the non-trademark use of the words "Simon Says" in connection
with any of their electronic simulations of the game "Simon Says."' 9
As Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. 20 has
made disturbingly clear, the price for creating and marketing a success-
ful game idea is frequently a loss of trademark rights through a finding
that the game name has become generic for the game.2 In Entex Indus-
tries the opposer attempted to demonstrate that if the name of the chil-
dren's game "Simon Says" is generic, then certainly an electronic
analogue of the game, using an abbreviated version of the name "Si-
mon Says," namely SIMON should also be deemed generic.
But as the Board correctly held, the electronic game SIMON is not
the same as the game "Simon Says," and the name SIMON is no less
than suggestive as applied to Milton Bradley's electronic game. Nor is
SIMON simply an abbreviation for "Simon Says"; especially since the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979). See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, A Proposal
For Evaluating Genericism After 'Anti-Monopoly, " 73 Trademark Rep. 101 (1983).
21. See I J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 12.11 (C) (1973 & Supp.
1982).
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overall impression created by the mark is a personalized name for the
game.
By selecting a name that personalized an electronic game, and at
the same time conjured up associations with a generic children's game,
Milton Bradley Co. did what is permissible in trademark law. At the
same time it created one of the most successful marks of the late '70s.
Elise Rickenbach
F. Sports Merchandise
1. Showing of Consumer Association Between a Mark and
its Source Sufficient to Establish Secondary Meaning and
Likelihood of Confusion
Federal trademark protection has historically been granted to the
producers of goods and services as a means of protecting the public so
that it can be confident that, in purchasing a product, it will get the
product it wants to buy.' A second purpose is to protect the goodwill
and recognition built up in products by trademark owners.' These
principles were recently applied in the context of the sponsorship and
licensing of sports merchandise, where the producer of goods was sepa-
rate from the trademark owner.
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sports-
wear, Inc. ,' applied traditional tests of secondary meaning and likeli-
hood of confusion to an infringement action brought by an exclusive
licensing representative of the trademark owners under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.4 The court held that, in the sponsorship context, a
showing of consumer association between a mark and its source was
sufficient to establish secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion,
even though the source was not the producer of the goods.
National Football League Properties, Inc. ("NFLP") was created
in 1963 as the exclusive licensing representative of the National Foot-
ball League member teams. NFLP licenses manufacturers to produce
1. 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §§ 2:1-2:14 (1973).
2. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Con-
gressional Service 1274.
3. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
4. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Section 43(a) provides, in relevant
part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion. . . shall be liable to a civil action. . . by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
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merchandise bearing the marks of NFL teams, collecting a 6.5% royalty
on all sales of licensed goods. These royalties are the sole source of
funds for the NFL Charities foundation, which in turn supports other
charitable organizations such as United Way and the National Negro
College Fund. NFLP also employs investigators nationwide to protect
team trademarks and authorized licensees from infringement.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc. ("Wichita") began operations in
1976 as a manufacturer of softball uniforms for local teams. In 1977,
Wichita began producing NFL team jersey replicas.
In 1978, NFLP discovered Wichita's activities and sent a "cease
and desist" letter, claiming trademark ownership and informing Wich-
ita of the infringing nature of its activities. Following some discus-
sions, Wichita apparently promised to cease production of jersey
replicas. However, in the spring of 1980, NFLP again received evi-
dence of infringing activities. It instituted suit and obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction in October, 1980, enjoining production of jerseys
bearing team, city/regional, or player names. The injunction was later
modified to allow production on the condition that a disclaimer label
be included on each jersey replica. At a subsequent contempt hearing,
Wichita was found in contempt of the initial injunction for continuing
production. Evidence was offered that the modification was not prop-
erly followed either, but no further contempt was found.
The court listed four elements of a jersey replica: (1) team colors,
(2) large contrasting numerals, (3) sleeve stripes or designs,5 and (4) a
descriptive term6 which relates the jersey to an NFL team. NFLP dis-
claimed any interest in jerseys not containing the descriptive fourth ele-
ment, narrowing the issue to the protectability of the team,
city/regional, or player name.
District Judge Coughenour limited his decision to the federal stat-
utory infringement ground,7 without reaching NFLP's other allega-
tions.8 He stated NFLP's burden as twofold, requiring that NFLP
5. Of the twenty-eight NFL teams, seven have plain sleeves, seventeen have striped
sleeves, and four have a team emblem on the sleeves.
6. Descriptive terms include the city name, regional name, team nickname, and player
name.
7. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
8. NFLP also asserted that Wichita's activities: (1) infringed federally registered serv-
ice marks, (2) infringed common law trademarks, (3) unfairly competed and misappropri-
ated commercial properties, (4) infringed Washington state registered trademarks,
(5) constituted deceptive business practices, (6) misappropriated common law rights of pub-
licity, and (7) tortiously interfered with the common law business relationships of NFLP.
532 F. Supp. at 654.
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establish both secondary meaning in the descriptive terms used by the
individual NFL teams, and likelihood of confusion among consumers
caused by Wichita's activities.
Secondary Meaning. The court first stated that the standard for
finding secondary meaning in sponsorship cases was not previously
well defined, citing HMH Publishing Co., Inc. v. Brincat. 9 The court
then stated that, generally, secondary meaning is shown by a connec-
tion in the buyer's mind between the product bearing the mark and its
source.'" Since likelihood of confusion in the sponsorship context is
shown by the consumer's belief that the product bearing the mark is
endorsed, produced, or authorized by the plaintiff, the court deduced
that secondary meaning could also be established by a showing of be-
lief that sponsorship or authorization was granted. The basis for such a
deduction was what the court termed "symmetry between the concepts
of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.""
The court cites Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Products Division of Gen-
eral Mills Fun Group, Inc., "z for the conclusion that secondary meaning
in the sponsorship context requires a showing of public belief in spon-
sorship or endorsement. In that case, Ideal sought a declaration that its
production of certain toys, which resembled characters from the movie
Star Wars, did not infringe copyrights or trademarks held by Kenner
and the producers of Star Wars. Throughout its opinion, the Ideal Toy
court referred to public identification or association of plaintiffs toys
with the alleged sponsor, requiring but not finding such a showing for
the establishment of secondary meaning.'3
Likelihood of Confusion. Relying on the standards set in JB. Wil-
9. 504 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1974). In Brincat, HMH alleged trademark infringement of
certain terms associated with Playboy magazine by Brincat, who used them in connection
with his automotive products business. Upholding the lower court finding of infringement,
the court stated that "the originally weak mark may come to be associated with registrant's
products to such an extent that the purchasing public generally believes that a product which
bears that mark is in some fashion connected with the products of the registrant." (emphasis
added). Id. at 718.
10. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980).
11. 532 F. Supp. at 659. The apparent symmetry is concerned with a connection in the
consumer's mind between a mark and the plaintiff/source. In the secondary meaning con-
text, the mark of the non-infringing party issues, while in the likelihood context, that of the
infringing party is used. In both cases, the source of the non-infringing mark is the object of
the mental connection.
12. 443 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
13. The survey results showed that from 55% to 80% of those tested associated a particu-
lar jersey with a particular NFL team, depending on the type of descriptive term employed
and the degree of fan sophistication.
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liams Co. v. LeConte Cosmetics, Inc. ,'4 the court stated that the hkeli-
hood of confusion is a conclusion reached after applying a multi-factor
analysis to the facts of each case. Of the factors outlined by the court in
Williams, those found most compelling by the NFLP court were the
strength of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, and the intent of
Wichita."'
Discussing the strength of the marks, the court stated that a strong
mark is inherently distinctive and is afforded the widest protection
from infringement,' 6 while even a weak mark may be entitled to some
limited protection. Team nicknames were found to be extremely arbi-
trary and fanciful-thus more distinctive-and entitled to broad pro-
tection. City/regional and player names were found to be inherently
non-distinctive, requiring a showing of secondary meaning for protec-
tion. Concluding that the necessary showing of secondary meaning
had been made, the court decided that city/regional and player names
were entitled to at least limited protection in the football jersey replica
market.
Although not requiring actual confusion to establish a likelihood
of confusion, 7 the court found that actual confusion had been demon-
strated by the survey evidence 8 and that this was a persuasive factor in
finding a likelihood of future confusion.' 9
Similarly, the court also found that, while not necessary to the es-
tablishment of likelihood of confusion, such likelihood is readily in-
ferred when the intent to exploit the goodwill and reputation associated
with a mark is demonstrated.2" Examining the record, the court pointed
to Wichita's "questionable conduct" as part of its determination that
the intent to create confusion existed. Specifically, the contempt pro-
ceedings, evidence of improper placement and wording of the dis-
claimer labels, inconsistencies in the testimony of Wichita's president,
and Wichita's continuing production after NFLP's "cease and desist"
letter were cited by the court as tending to show an overall intent by
Wichita to infringe the plaintiffs trademark goodwill.
14. 523 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975).
15. Other factors listed by the court were similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning;
the class of goods; and the marketing channels utilized.
16. See AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979).
17. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 159 (9th Cir.
1963).
18. Actual confusion, as shown by the percentage of those believing that authorization
was required in order to produce the jerseys, ranged from 41.8% for city/regional names to
53.6% for player names.
19. See AMF, 599 F.2d at 352.
20. See HMfH Publishing, 504 F.2d at 720.
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Based on its conclusions regarding this evidence of likelihood of
confusion, as well as its determination of the similarity of the type of
goods, the overlap in marketing channels, and the similarity in appear-
ance of the goods, the court concluded that Wichita's activities in-
fringed the right to prevent consumer confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of jersey replicas.
In reaching this result, the court denied three defenses asserted by
Wichita. First, Wichita claimed that the marks are functional21 and
thus not protectable. Without answering this question of functionality,
the court decided that functional features can sometimes be protected,
concluding that the showing of secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion made by NFLP demonstrated a secondary purpose of identi-
fication of source, in addition to any functional value the trademarks
might have.
Second, Wichita argued that under the doctrine of Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stffel Co. ,22 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. ,23
the trademark protection afforded here would constitute an improper
monopoly.2" The court also cited Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd ,25 for the position that the Sears-Compco deci-
sions did not affect trademark law concerning origin and sponsorship.26
The court stated its view that Sears-Compco is limited in its applica-
tion, dealing only with entire products not protectable under federal
patent or copyright law rather than simply the use of a protectable
mark on a product.
Finally, Wichita claimed that the marks were not protectable, be-
ing generic for NFL football jerseys. The court defined a generic mark
as one which denotes a product itself, not its producer.27 Relying on
NFLP's showing of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion,
the court concluded that the primary significance of the marks was
source identification, not product denotation.
28
21. Functional features are those which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer
wishes to purchase or an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product.
Functional marks are historically not protectable.
22. 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661 (1964).
23. 376 U.S. 234, 84 S.Ct. 779, 11 L.Ed.2d 669 (1964).
24. The Sears-Compco decisions held that states may not protect what is unprotectable
under federal law. Thus, designs "not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory
protection . . . can be copied at will." (emphasis added). 376 U.S. at 238.
25. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
26. Id. at 204.
27. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir.
1979).
28. 532 F.Supp. at 663.
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Conceptually, NFLP v. Wichita presents a number of difficult and
unique features which may result in unexpected problems of applica-
tion. For example, Judge Coughenour's emphasis on the charitable na-
ture of NFLP's activities and his extensive discussion of Wichita's
"questionable" conduct draws an emotional "good and evil" dichot-
omy into the court's decision. Others may properly question whether,
given this emphasis, such emotional factors may have played too great
a role in the court's reasoning.
The court's analysis of the protectability of city/regional names
also presents analytical problems. Although the court cites Norm
Thompson Ouqtters, Inc. v. GeneralMotors, Inc. ,29 for the position that
regional names may be protectable, that interpretation is misleading.
Thompson involved the use of the same slogan by the parties, in cloth-
ing and automobile sales respectively. The issue in Thompson was
whether there was a likelihood of confusion, given the difference in
products. The only reference to geographically descriptive terms states
that such terms are protectable only on a showing of long and exclusive
use which has resulted in the term coming to mean that the article
bearing the descriptive term is a particular producers' product.
30
The problem in protecting city/regional names is emphasized in
the football context by an example. There are now at least four profes-
sional football franchises using the city name "Los Angeles."' 3' By a
unique set of circumstances, 32 none can easily claim long or exclusive
use of the descriptive term "Los Angeles" in this context. Such city
names can realistically be protected only in combination with the vis-
ual elements of the appropriate team jersey or a colorable imitation.
To hold otherwise would restrict the use of such terms to the first user
with some degree of popularity or a large advertising budget, and could
eventually product a broad monopoly on a name, given a sufficiently
long use to establish strong secondary meaning. Although explicitly
considering the descriptive terms independently, the court seemingly
recognized this problem and analyzed the city/regional term in connec-
tion with the remaining elements of a jersey replica.
Also misleading is the court's reliance, in finding intent to create
confusion, on Wichita's continued production of replicas following
29. 448 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1971).
30. Id. at 1296.
31. Los Angeles Raiders (NFL), Los Angeles Rams (NFL), Los Angeles Express
(USFL), and the unnamed IFL team.
32. The Raiders are completing their second season in Los Angeles, the Express is pre-
paring for its second season, the Rams have actually moved to Anaheim, and the IFL team
exists only on paper at this time.
1984]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
NFLP's "cease and desist" letter. Interpretation of such an act is sub-
ject to manipulation, depending on the desired result. It may show in-
tent when a finding of infringement is made or desired, but may only
show sound business judgment if no infringement is found.
In general, the court seems to emphasize more heavily the factors
of actual confusion and intent of the alleged infringer, glossing over
other elements, such as similarities in the products and markets, in its
finding of likelihood of confusion. Having already postulated the close
relationship between secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion in
terms of the type of proof required, this emphasis can be seen as a first
step toward adopting actual deception as a substitute for secondary
meaning.33 This interpretation seems even more likely, given the
court's recognition of the general rule that neither is otherwise neces-
sary to proof of infringement.
In spite of these criticisms of the court's reasoning, the real key to
resolving problems in the sponsorship context lies in an interpretation
of the Lanham Act. If the purpose of trademark protection is only to
protect the consumer from confusion, then it is very difficult to justify
protecting a trademark which is not utilized in a particular context
(here jersey replicas) by the trademark owner. It is difficult to argue
that consumers will be deceived as to the origin of jersey replicas. Most
consumers buy such items with no thought whatsoever about sponsor-
ship, instead concerning themselves with finding the jersey which will
associate them with the desired NFL team, no matter who the producer
or sponsor is. The survey data presented by NFLP does not affect this
theory: consumers are more likely to consider a question as to sponsor-
ship when asked on a survey than when they are considering a
purchase. Unlike other cases in which the packaging dress or the name
placed on goods may mislead consumers as to what they are actually
purchasing, here the mark itself satisfies the degree of certainty the con-
sumer desires in making his purchase. The four elements making up a
jersey replica are what the consumer seeks,34 not sponsorship.
Conversely, if the purpose of trademark protection is also to pro-
tect the goodwill of the trademark owner, it is very difficult to justify
allowing appropriation of that goodwill, lacking some public policy to
the contrary. As Wichita contended, improper monopoly would be one
such overriding policy. However, as the court observed, "Plaintiffs do
33. The "New York Rule." See Santa's Workshop, Inc. v. Sterling, 282 App.Div. 328,
122 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1953). See also J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition,
§ 15:4 (1973).
34. Color, large numerals, sleeve designs, and descriptive term.
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not seek to prohibit the manufacture of jerseys, only jerseys which bear
their marks."35 The question as to how to resolve this tension between
the trademark protection and the restrictions on monopoly are beyond
the scope of this article. However, as a general comment, if a protect-
able interest exists, then this basic purpose of trademark law is argua-
bly triggered, no matter what other characteristics the mark may
possess.
36
Another court has recently considered the problems in the spon-
sorship context, although refusing to decide the issue. University of
Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc. , provided a brief survey of the
leading cases on the sponsorship question, decided the case on another
basis, and remanded to the District Court for resolution of the issue.
In its earlier decision, 38 the district court had found that the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh ("Pitt") had delayed, at least from 1960 to 1980,19
in bringing suit to enforce its trademark rights. The court also found
that Champion Products, Inc. ("Champion") had relied to its detriment
on Pitt's inaction, building up substantial business goodwill through its
own efforts. The court then held that the doctrine of laches4 ° prevented
Pitt from recovering damages for past infringement and from obtaining
an injunction against Champion for future activities.
The circuit court affirmed the holding as to damages for past in-
fringement, but reversed and remanded for reconsideration of prospec-
tive relief.
The district court's findings of fact indicate that Pitt began using
its present name, emblem, and Panther mascot shortly after 1908. In
1933 or 1934, Champion developed and patented the silk-screen
method of producing soft goods imprinted with the symbols and em-
blems of colleges and sports teams. In approximately 1936, Champion
began supplying imprinted athletic uniforms and other soft goods to
Pitt, for use by its teams or sale in its bookstore.4 1
Since 1946, Champion had also sold Pitt-imprinted soft goods to
35. 532 F. Supp. at 663.
36. Other characteristics include functionality, genericness, descriptiveness, and geo-
graphic naming.
37. 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 571 (1982).
38. 529 F.Supp. 464 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
39. There is some evidence in the record, though not as strong, that the delay began in
1946, when Champion began selling Pitt-imprinted soft goods to retail stores not affiliated
with the University.
40. The court defined the defense of laches as composed of the following elements: (I) a
long period of unexcused inaction, (2) open and notorious infringement, (3) detrimental
reliance, and (4) lack of fraud in the initial infringing use.
41. 529 F.Supp. at 466.
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businesses near, but not affiliated with, the University campus. In
1960, Pitt discontinued sales through its bookstore, but other merchants
continued supplying students, faculty, and others with Pitt-imprinted
soft goods.42
The district court specifically found constructive, if not actual,
knowledge of Champion's activities by Pitt, at least for the period 1960
to 1980, when no on-campus sales were authorized.43 In addition,
Champion was found to have relied on Pitt's decision not to enforce its
rights and to have built up a substantial part of its business based on
the continued use of Pitt's marks.'
The court of appeals agreed that inactivity over such a long period
would, without more, operate to foreclose an award of damages for
past infringement. Based on a series of cases defining and employing
the doctrine of laches, 45 the court also found that Champion's contin-
ued operations did not depend solely or significantly on the use of Pitt's
marks, eliminating the element of detrimental reliance from Cham-
pion's laches defense.
The court of appeals also specifically instructed the district court to
consider existing precedent in other circuits on the question of stan-
dards of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion in sponsorship
cases. The court listed five cases46 for particular consideration by the
district court, although it expressed no opinion on their relative merits,
stating only that they ". . . [reflect] a growing and unsettled aspect of
the law of unfair competition both at common law and under the Lan-
ham Act."47
The court of appeals first discussed what it called the "landmark
case in this area,"48 Boston Pro. Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc. " Boston Hockey concerned the production and sale of em-
broidered cloth emblems bearing the marks of National Hockey
League teams by an unauthorized manufacturer. The Fifth Circuit had
42. 529 F.Supp. at 467.
43. 529 F.Supp. at 468, district court findings 21, 22, 23.
44. 529 F.Supp. at 468, district court findings 25 and 30.
45. 686 F.2d at 1044-1046. See Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252 (3d
Cir. 1974); Alfred Dunhill of London v. Kasser Dist. Prod. Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1341 (E.D.
Pa. 1972), afT'd me., 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1973); Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 9 S.Ct.
143, 32 L.Ed. 526 (1888); and Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d
Cir. 1978).
46. Of the five, two are in the Fifth Circuit, one in the Seventh Circuit, and two in the
Ninth Circuit.
47. 686 F.2d at 1047.
48. Id
49. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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held that consumers were not confused as to the source of manufacture
of the emblems, but nevertheless were confused because of "[t]he cer-
tain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trade-
mark symbols were in the plaintiff."5
The court then described NFLP v. Wichita as elaborating on the
same theory as Boston Hockey, describing the problem as "confusion of
sponsorship."'"
The court also cited Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communica-
tions,52 as taking a similar position. Processed Plastic concerned the
production of plastic model cars in the form of the "General Lee" from
the television show "The Dukes of Hazzard." The Seventh Circuit re-
ferred to the establishment of ". . . the existence of secondary meaning
in this case inasmuch as the toy cars are associated with a single source
• ..even though Warner Bros., Inc. in not a manufacturer of toy
cars."
53
Next, the court discussed Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbowfor
Girls v. J.H Ray Jewelry Co. ,54 finding that the Fifth Circuit had ap-
parently retreated from some of the broader language in Boston Hock-
ey. The issue in Order of Rainbow was whether an unauthorized
jeweler infringed the plaintiff's trademark and the license of the "offi-
cial jeweler" by manufacturing Rainbow Jewelry using the Order's
marks, but not those of the "official jeweler." Although the lower court
found that the Rainbow emblem was functional and not protectable,
the court of appeals only upheld the lower court's finding that likeli-
hood of confusion had not been demonstrated. Two facts were found
to distinguish the case from Boston Hockey. First, the lower court
found that there was no support for the assumption that buyers of
Rainbow Jewelry believed that sponsorship or approval was required
to make or sell jewelry bearing the Rainbow mark. Second, the court
also found that the only "official jeweler" of the Order added his own
mark to his products, creating the inference that no other jewelry was
endorsed or sponsored by the Order.
Finally, the court mentioned International Order of Job's Daugh-
ters v. Lindeburg & Co. , as almost entirely rejecting the theory of Bos-
ton Hockey. Like Order of Rainbow, Job's Daughters involved a young
50. 510 F.2d at 1012.
51. NFL', 532 F.Supp. at 659.
52. 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. Id at 856.
54. 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1981).
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women's fraternal organization and its efforts to prevent a jeweler from
using its emblem on unauthorized jewelry. In expressly rejecting Bos-
ton Hockey, the Ninth Circuit held that Job's Daughter's mark was
functional, being included on the jewelry not to identify its origin or
sponsorship, but for its intrinsic value as a component of the jewelry.
The court also stated its opinion that the Lanham Act granted rights to
the trademark owner only to the extent necessary to protect consumers.
Although the Third Circuit in Pitt v. Champion found a serious
disagreement among the circuits, the cases are not irreconcilable. First,
if one accepts the Senate Report on the Lanham Act56 and agrees that
one of the purposes of trademark protection is to protect the trademark
owner, then theory would indicate that even "aesthetically functional"
marks are protectable after a showing of secondary meaning and likeli-
hood of confusion, i.e. when they have been the subject of long and
exclusive use or extensive publicity and the trademark owner can
demonstrate a misapprehension among buyers as to the source or spon-
sor of the product. 7
Second, even if there is no agreement as to the extent or existence
of protection of trademark owners under the Lanham Act, these cases
may still be distinguished and reconciled on their facts. All three of the
cases finding a protectable interest in the trademark owner found sec-
ondary meaning in the marks in question, concentrating on the likeli-
hood of confusion as to source or sponsorship. Both of the cases
finding no protectable interest concentrated on the issue of secondary
meaning, finding that, in the narrow context of jewelry for young wo-
men's organizations, there was no basis for a showing of secondary
meaning because of a non-exclusive use of the marks. Even by the
standards set out in Boston Hockey, the marks were not protectable.
Although Supreme Court consideration of the sponsorship prob-
lem seems unlikely in the near future, certiorari having been refused on
both Boston Hockey5" and Pitt v. Champion,59 the decision on remand
56. See supra note I and accompanying text.
57. See In re Penthouse International Ltd., 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977); Duft, "'Aes-
thetic" Functionality, 73 Trademark Rep. 151 (1983); Zelnick, The Doctrine of Functionality,
73 Trademark Rep. 128 (1983). See also Note, Trademarks.- Protection of Merchandising
Properties in Professional Sports, 21 Duquesne L. Rev. 927 (1983).
58. 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
59. 103 S.Ct. 571 (1982).
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in Pitt could go far toward shedding some light on this difficult and
confused area of trademark law.
Lee Heiman

